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SOCIAL MOBILITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
 
SEBASTIÁN GALIANI 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Si bien la definición precisa del término “movilidad social” es discutible, suele 
asociarse a una situación en que el status económico relativo de un agente no 
es dependiente de sus condiciones iniciales, tales como el ingreso de sus 
padres o su contexto familiar. Para analizar los determinantes de la movilidad, 
hay que investigar los canales a partir de los cuales los ingresos de los hijos 
están correlacionados con los de sus padres, ya sea mediante la educación, las 
oportunidades o el status económico. El presente trabajo investiga la relación 
entre movilidad social e inequidad, entre otras dimensiones relevantes de la 
distribución de ingresos que se determinan simultáneamente. El trabajo 
enfatiza la relevancia de la movilidad social en tanto afecta variables que 
determinan el bienestar y la eficiencia económica, y por consiguiente las 
políticas que la promueven. 
Clasificación JEL: D6, D3, J6 
Palabras Clave: Movilidad social, Inequidad, Eficiencia 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The definition of social mobility is a matter of debate. In the following 
discussion, conceptual issues in the literature on mobility are commented. This 
paper defines social mobility as a situation in which the relative economic 
status of an agent is not dependent on starting conditions such as parental 
income or family background. Analyzing the determinants of mobility 
involves exploring the channels through which offspring’s income is 
correlated to its parents’, such as inherited bequest, education, skills, among 
many others. This survey explores, in an analytical framework, the relation 
between social mobility and inequality, among other important dimensions of 
income distribution that are jointly determined. The focus is on the relevance 
of social mobility as it affects variables determining welfare and economic 
efficiency, and therefore on policies to promote it. 
JEL Classification: D6, D3, J6 
Keywords: Social mobility, Inequality, Efficiency 
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SOCIAL MOBILITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
 
SEBASTIÁN GALIANI1 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The definition of social mobility is the object of discussion, and although 
there is a common thread that runs through all of these discussions, the actual 
definition varies from study to study. There is agreement that social mobility 
refers to “movements by specific entities between periods in socioeconomic 
status indicators” (Behrman, 2000) and that it aims to quantify “the movement 
of given [entities] through the distribution of economic well-being over time, 
establishing how dependent one’s current economic position is on one’s past 
position, and relating people’s mobility experiences” to the overall conditions 
of the economy in which they operate (Fields, 2000). Differences arise, 
however, when an attempt is made to endow these definitions with empirical 
content (i.e., when an effort is made to determine what variable should be used 
to measure mobility, what exactly should be considered “movement” in a 
distribution, or what time spans should be used to evaluate mobility). In the 
following discussion, we briefly comment on some of the conceptual issues 
that have been raised in the literature on mobility. 
Among the multiple considerations concerning the definition of mobility, in 
this paper we define social mobility as a situation in which the relative 
economic status of an agent is not dependent on starting conditions such as 
parental income or family background. Therefore, analyzing  the  determinants  
of  mobility  involves  exploring  the  channels through which offspring’s 
income is correlated to its parents’, such as inherited bequest, education, 
formal rules, skills, opportunities, working spirit, among many others. 
As parental linkage is a source of differences in income among individuals, 
there is a deep relation between social mobility and inequality. They are jointly 
determined, and the most prevalent theoretical association between mobility 
and inequality is negative; since structural conditions that lead to low mobility 
also tend to favor unequal outcomes. 
                                                 
1 Maryland University. 
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Assessing inequality, leads us to investigate analytical frameworks to 
analyze the sources of differences in incomes: from effort, education and 
ability to the beliefs about the nature of the income generating process.  As 
long as these determinants are at least partially related to the parental 
background, we will find a strong link between social mobility and: equal 
opportunities, meritocracy, human capital accumulation, politico- economic 
considerations and beliefs, which we will account for in this survey. 
Furthermore, when initial conditions prevent individuals from allocating 
resources optimally, if social mobility is limited, economic efficiency is 
reduced. For example, this happens whenever liquidity constraints prevent 
individuals from acquiring an efficient level of human capital. Therefore, it is 
of great relevance to understand that social mobility and efficiency are also 
determined together. 
Finally, throughout this survey, we map the key parameters affecting 
mobility into proposed policy actions, from each model studied. We find that 
policies that break the dependence of outcomes on initial conditions, such us 
universal public education or early intervention programs may be successful in 
raising income and social mobility. Furthermore, due to the relationship 
between mobility and other social and economic dimension such as efficiency 
and inequality; those policies can have broader short and long term effects. 
This survey is divided into 7 sections. In the first one, some preliminary 
concepts related to the definition of mobility are briefly explained. Section 2 
comprises the review of a range of models of income mobility that relates it to 
human capital, credit constraints, education and technology, among others. 
The third section deals with the politico- economic considerations regarding 
inequality and mobility.  The next section introduces a key concept: efficiency, 
in the context of the models that assess social mobility. In section 5, there is a 
discussion about the effects of social mobility from an economic efficiency 
and also from political outcomes points of view. Section 6 includes models 
that consider the perception of mobility. To conclude, in section 7, there is a 
summary of the policy implications of the surveyed models, showing the 
different policies that have the potential to improve social mobility in the short 
and long terms. 
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II.  Preliminary concepts  
 
Socioeconomic status indicators 
When studying mobility, we are interested in using an indicator that can 
capture some element of economic well-being. This entails taking variables 
into consideration which measure long-term status rather than short-term 
fluctuations (we do not, after all, want to confuse social mobility with 
economic insecurity). When trying to encapsulate this general idea of concrete, 
operational content, we may want to consider consumption (which is, 
presumably, closely linked to permanent income), educational attainment, 
asset holdings (wealth), or some composite measure of socioeconomic level. 
Data availability considerations, unfortunately, quickly limit the scope of 
the indicators used in actual studies, as mobility research calls for long panels, 
or, at the least, information on parents and offspring. However, data on 
intergenerational educational attainment can be found, partly because 
retrospective questions (questions on parental educational attainment, for 
instance) are bound to be reliably answered. As a result, most of the studies 
now available focus on income and educational attainment. 
 
Time period 
There are two main types of mobility that we may want to study, depending 
on the length of time we allow for changes to take place. Intragenerational 
mobility refers to movements in the indicator of choice that occur in a 
relatively short time span – typically within an individual’s adulthood. 
Intergenerational mobility, on the other hand, refers to changes that are 
observed from one generation to the next. Thus, intragenerational mobility 
studies follow individuals throughout their lives, while intergenerational 
studies focus on entire dynasties, tracking their movements from one 
generation to the next. 
 
Movements 
The main source of controversy regarding social mobility is arguably the 
issue of how to define “movement” within a distribution. Different concerns 
give rise to very different ideas about how to quantify changes in an 
individual’s economic status. A very preliminary observation is that no 
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meaningful “movement” can ever occur unless there is variability in the values 
of the indicator to be studied. In other words, income mobility would be an 
empty concept if income inequality did not matter. 
Fields (2000) provides a useful categorization of different mobility 
concepts, as well as stating some of the implicit assumptions and value 
judgments underlying each one. He shows that the kind of normative (or 
subjective) choice that is made in studies of social mobility goes beyond 
simply deciding whether it is a “good” or “bad” feature. Following Fields 
(2000), imagine the following societies numbered from 1 to 5, formed by 3 
individuals (these are somewhat extreme examples, but serve to point out the 
sources of disagreement): 
 
Table 1.  
Hypothetical changes in income distributions 
 
 
Any relative measure of mobility would indicate that, in going from society 
1 to society 2, there has been perfect mobility. The correlation between the 
two, indeed, is zero. But note that average wealth has gone down and, as a 
result, so have income levels for all but one of the individuals. The transition 
from society 2 to society 3, where the correlation is 0.5 – mobility is much 
lower – but all incomes have gone up, is the mirror image of the first. In this 
sense, it could be argued that the movement from 2 to 3 is more desirable than 
from 1 to 2. 
The main point here is that relative measures of mobility do not take 
changes in the average income level into account. We believe that mobility 
concerns arise mainly because of relative considerations. In other words, 
societies tend to favor situations where individuals’ relative status is 
considerably independent from their parents’ degree of success, and this is best 
captured by measures of relative mobility. 
One distinction should be noted with regard to measures of relative 
mobility. Positional movement takes place when an individual changes her 
position in the overall distribution. Related to this is share movement, which 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Andrea 20 5 20 40 5 
Brian 10 10 30 20 1 
Chris 3 1 2 6 1 
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focuses on the change in an individual’s share of the overall total.2 Both are 
instances of what Behrman (2000) calls “relative” or “exchange” mobility. 
A process whereby all members double their incomes would be perfectly 
immobile under both measures (this would correspond to going from society 1 
to society 4). Also, a process in which total income decreases and inequality 
increases while ranks remain the same would show no positional mobility, but 
shares would have changed (this is the case in going from distribution 4 to 5). 
Rankings can also change drastically with very little change in income, as is 
the case in the shift from society 2 to society 5.3 
The aim is to isolate the distributional component from mobility. The 
lesson to be learned from these examples is that a complete picture of the 
desirability of an income process cannot be derived from any one summary 
measure because changes in average income levels, changes in the overall 
distribution, and the degree to which relative performance in one generation 
depends on relative performance in the past must all be taken into account. 
Absolute movement measures, in contrast, focus on quantifying the total 
change, regardless of whether any exchange mobility has taken place.  
Although we may be content with quantifying movement – whatever definition 
we decide upon – it is usually the case that we also want to capture other 
aspects of movement. In particular, studies of social mobility are generally 
concerned with gauging how dependent final outcomes are on initial 
conditions. In other words, income mobility may exist because individual 
incomes follow an identical random process, independent of initial income, or 
there may be some sort of dependence – usually captured by a correlation 
                                                 
2 Although we are trying to avoid referring to “income” in order to drive home the point that 
we are interested in a broader notion of “social” mobility, it is clear that there must be some 
quantitative element in order to talk meaningfully about “shares”. 
3 This kind of objection is valid to some extent, and we mention it because some of the 
researchers in this area actually do raise such objections. But the fact is that this kind of 
example does not seem to be in line with what we see – or would expect to see – in real life 
settings. And relative movements do have the advantage that they capture the persistence of 
inequality in a way that absolute measures do not precisely because they abstract away from 
changes in mean income, or even in its distribution. The main point to be made here is that, 
just as reporting on inequality does not seem complete without studying mobility, measuring 
mobility will not give us a perfect picture of how “desirable” a given society is. Undeniably, it 
is also true for any other one-dimensional measure. 
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coefficient – between income realizations for the same individual (or dynasty) 
across time. Most studies of mobility equate time dependence with immobility 
and, generally speaking, this is the approach that is favored in this paper. 
We believe that the concept of mobility is quite distinct from that of 
economic growth and is closely connected to notions of efficiency, fairness, 
and political conflict which follow paths that are largely unconnected to 
overall growth. This is why we choose to focus on measures of relative, rather 
than absolute, mobility. As will be made clear in this paper, the time span to be 
chosen will depend on the context of the analysis, while the issue of time 
dependence will invariably play an important role: increasing social mobility 
implies breaking the dependence of individual economic outcomes on initial 
conditions. 
 
III.  Models of income mobility 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) were one of the first to model income mobility 
and inequality. In their economy, there is a continuum of dynasties. Each 
generation values its own consumption as well as its offspring’s income:  
 
U t   U t Z t , I t 1        (1)
   
where U t  is parents’ utility, Z t stands for parents’ consumption, and I t 1 is the 
adult wealth of their children. 
This wealth is embodied in a stock of human and nonhuman capital  that 
has three sources: a direct investment from each generation’s parents (y); 
endowed “luck” that is correlated  across  contiguous  generations  of  the  
same  dynasty  (e)  (which  can  be interpreted as ability, intelligence, social 
background or values, and family connections); and sheer market luck (u).  
 
It 1   wt 1 yt 1  wt 1et 1  wt 1ut 1                 (2) 
 
In other words, individuals in this model are considered as helping their 
children out in two ways.  They  can  deliberately decide  to  leave  them  
“capital”  by  investing  in  their  education  or providing them with financial 
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capital. In addition, they always pass on family characteristics that were 
assigned by “luck” to each dynasty.  A natural interpretation would involve 
genetic characteristics, but there are also family connections, “norms” or 
“customs” within each household, as well as other non-biological traits, that 
are largely the result of each family’s history and that cannot be radically 
changed by any individual dynasty. A poor parent cannot build family 
connections out of thin air. 
Of course, there is a final element of “luck” in determining individual 
income; people will typically differ in the extent to which they take full 
advantage of their endowment, and their resourcefulness or drive may lead 
them to find new opportunities. Serendipity may also intervene. This is the 
way in which the term u should be interpreted. 
As can be seen from equation (2), each part of this capital stock has the 
same (constant) market return, w.4 Parents are assumed to be risk-neutral and 
to choose their bequests in order to maximize their own expected utility, 
subject to a budget constraint (where r is the intergenerational rate of return), 
 
   
          
     
        (3) 
 
and a law of motion for endowed luck that depends on the family endowment 
and the average level of endowed luck in the economy. 
 
et 1   1 h  f  et   het   vt 1      (4) 
 
In this law of motion, h represents the fraction of family endowment that is 
inherited, and f is the aggregate rate of growth, while v is a random shock. We 
thus allow for slow changes in family “luck”. It may be the case that a rich 
family loses part of its connections, or that someone from a family that does 
not value “hard work” may still turn out to be hardworking and pass this trait 
on to his children. In any case, as we will see, h is a very important parameter 
of the model, as it measures the extent to which family “luck” is equalized 
across dynasties. When h is close to 0, family endowments are basically 
                                                 
4 Thus, both inequality and mobility refer to the distribution of capital stock or of all sources of 
income. 
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identical, with some random variation. When it is close to 1, dynasties differ 
permanently. 
Families fully anticipate inherited endowment but not random luck. From 
standard expected utility maximization, and normalizing r and w to equal 1, 
the income of children in the t+1 generation of the ith family can be expressed 
as: 
 
   
         
        
       
       
       (5) 
 
Using Table 2, equation (5) says that income in a given generation basically 
depends on parental wealth and endowments, although an additional effect is 
generated through endowed and market luck. Crucially, parental preferences 
determine how strong this dependence is. This model captures the fact that 
anticipated luck affects how much capital parents leave to their offspring, 
which is why both market and endowment luck are not fully appropriated by 
their children (they only get to enjoy a proportion α). 
 
Table 2. 
Key Variables in Becker and Tomes (1979) 
 
 
All families are assumed to be identical. This means income inequality 
depends on the past history of market luck. Assuming that parameters are such 
that the persistence of initial conditions is limited ( , h  1), income in 
generation t+1 is:  
 
Variable Interpretation/Definition Depends 
 Proportion of parents’ wealth 
that goes to children´s income 
-Parents´utility function-  
specifically how much 
childrens´income affects  
parental welfare. 
- Intergenerational rate of return. 
 Actual value of the propensity 
to invest in children 
 =  1  r 
 
a Baseline endowed ability    1  h 
 1 
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(   )(   )
  ∑             
   ∑ .
         
   
/          
      (6) 
 
and the (squared) coefficient of the variation in income – a measure of 
inequality4 – is: 
 
   
  
   
   
    
  
(    )(   )
(    )(   )
    
          (7)
  
That is, inequality has two components: one that comes from market luck 
(u), and one that comes from endowed advantages (e).5 Clearly, if any of these 
components were less variable, income inequality would go down. The 
additional insight derived from this model comes through the effects of   and 
h. 
Note that the coefficient for endowed family luck is larger than the 
coefficient for market luck. The difference between them grows as   and h 
becomes larger. That is, as we increase the actual value of the propensity of 
each generation to invest in the next and the degree of family inheritability of 
characteristics that affect income, we give greater weight in overall inequality 
to family-specific advantages. 
However, whereas an increase in h unambiguously increases inequality, an 
increase in   – say, as the result of a change in preferences or through an 
increase in market returns – reduces the coefficient of variation in income. 
This is the result of the fact that, while it increases the variance in income, it 
increases the level of income even more. 
We next turn to income mobility and then analyze how   and h affect the 
tradeoff between inequality and mobility. The preferred measure of income 
mobility in this article is the effect of an increase in income for generation t on 
the incomes of subsequent generations. This gives us an idea of how quickly 
“temporary” increases in social standing fade away. It measures how long it 
takes to go “from rags to riches and back”. In other words, it captures our 
                                                 
4 The coefficient of variation of a random variable is defined as the ratio of its standard 
deviation to its mean, CV  x   x / x . In this case, v has zero mean, so that its standard 
deviation is normalized by average endowed luck, or e.  
5 The last term actually reflects exogenous variation in endowed luck, since      
  
 
(    )
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preferred concept of mobility as the degree of dependence of current outcomes 
on past performance.  Lower persistence is equivalent to higher mobility. 
 
Table 3. 
Effects of one-time changes in income 
 
 
This effect will depend on the source of the increase in income and how its 
magnitude hinges on the interplay between optimizing behavior and 
inheritability. 
Indeed, if we cal call  I t  a change in income for generation t, and we trace 
changes in the mth generation, we can envision the different scenarios 
described in Table 3. 
When the degree of inheritability of endowed luck is close to zero, a look at 
equation (5) tells us that each generation will receive a fraction   of any 
change in the income of the previous generation, regardless of the source of 
this income. This change will decrease as the distance between generations 
increases, given our assumption that    . In other words, when families do 
not provide sizeable (dis)advantages to their offspring, mobility is high. 
If inheritability was high, but investments were not influenced by changes 
in endowments – that is, if families did not optimize – we would see a similar 
response to a change in endowment. However, if we take into account the fact 
that families do optimize, we can see that, for some parameter values, a change 
in family endowment at time t can compound over time before it fades away 
(implying that a “lucky” generation will make its descendants luckier than 
Source of 
Change 
𝜹𝑰𝒕+𝒎
𝒊  Behavioral and 
Parametric 
Assumptions 
As m Goes to 
Infinity 
Market or 
endowed luck 
 𝛿 𝑡
𝑖   H negligible  < 1 Declines monotonically 
Endowment hm 𝑡𝑖  
No optimization 
investments are 
given 
Declines monotonically 
Endowment 
    (1 −  )
 𝑚 −  𝑚
 −  
𝛿 𝑡
𝑖
  
 
Optimal behavior 
 +  > 1 
 
Optimal behavior 
 +  < 1 
 
Rises up to a peak in a 
generation that depends on 
 +  , then declines 
monotonically 
Declines monotonically 
 
 1 
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average for a relatively long time). This is exactly the result that we would 
associate with a lack of social mobility. 
We can now see how income inequality and social mobility may be 
negatively or positively correlated, depending on what is driving their 
movements. When intergenerational inheritability of advantage increases, 
income inequality goes up and social mobility goes down. Thus, differences 
between families are exacerbated and made more persistent. This is intuitive: 
if family connections or race become more important in determining 
individual income, we would expect differences between families to become 
more pronounced and permanent. 
When the propensity to invest in children goes up, mobility again is 
reduced, because a one-time shock to income takes more time to fade away. 
However, in the long run, income differences are reduced, so income 
inequality goes down. 
We can summarize these findings in the following table. 
 
Table 4. 
Relationship between inequality and mobility when parameter values 
change 
 
 
Clearly,   is not a parameter that can be manipulated by public policy. It is 
quite impractical and, arguably, even unethical for the state to try to convince 
parents to care less (or more) for their children’s well-being.  However, it is 
not implausible for alterations in h to fall within the scope of public policy. 
Note that a decrease in h is equivalent to a homogenization of endowments.  
That is, a decline in h makes endowments more likely to equal the average. 
Hence, a policy that, for example, calls for investments to be made in raising 
 
Parameter 
 
Interpretation   Effect of an Increase in Parameter   on Inequality on Mobility 

 
h 
Parental propensity to 
invest in children 
Inheritability of 
family advantage 
 
Reduces Inequality 
 
Increases Inequality 
 
Reduces Mobility 
 
Reduces Mobility 
 1 
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the quality of public education while making it more homogeneous6 would 
probably redund in a decrease of h, and also reduce inequality. 
Another way of changing h is by promoting meritocratic employment 
policies, possibly through encouragement of market competition among 
potential employers. Why would market competition help attain a 
meritocracy? Advantages in the labor market that are not related to higher 
productivity – such as race or family connections – can only persist if 
companies that engage in these hiring practices are shielded from their 
consequences. Firms in a competitive environment, in contrast, will come 
under pressure to adopt practices that favor productivity over personal 
loyalties or racial prejudice. 
The main claim underlying these suggestions is that policies that break the 
dependence of outcomes on initial conditions are unambiguously desirable. 
Becker and Tomes (1979) abstract from the determination of the return to 
human capital, equating it to physical capital and operating within a stationary 
economy. Although the basic insight – that mobility and inequality are 
affected by the way in which parents optimize when making their decisions, as 
well as by inheritance of personal qualities – is not in dispute, some 
unbundling of the process of human capital accumulation as an additional 
force driving inequality and mobility remains to be done. We will comment on 
two lines of work. One focuses on purely economic forces, while the second 
adds politico-economic considerations. 
 
III.1. Building on Becker and Tomes: Human capital and credit 
constraints 
 
Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira (2003) and Owen and Weil (1998) 
show how inequality and mobility may be jointly determined in a general 
equilibrium model with overlapping generations of workers. In both cases, 
they draw a distinction between skilled and unskilled workers.  They analyze 
mobility by determining the odds that the child of an uneducated worker will 
                                                 
6 And, potentially, more similar to education in private schools.  
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become skilled (upward mobility), or the odds that the child of a skilled 
worker will not receive an education (downward mobility).7 
The key issue in both models is the lack of access to a credit market, since 
such access would allow “high-ability” individuals to invest in their education. 
This is a very practical concern, as much as it has the consequence of making 
educational decisions (and, therefore, income) strongly dependent on parental 
background. In other words, it is a reinterpretation of the parameter h in the 
Becker and Tomes (1979) model. 
Both models assume that ability is not genetically determined. This is 
why credit market failures end up accounting for most of inefficient 
immobility. The key point to bear in mind, though, is that this is a simplifying 
assumption which serves to highlight what aspects other than genetic 
endowments may affect intergenerational mobility. These effects would persist 
even if ability were, to some degree, genetically inherited. 
 
III.2. Owen and Weil: Liquidity constraints and multiple equilibria 
 
Owen and Weil (1998) model the joint determination of aggregate output, 
income distribution, mobility, and returns to education in general equilibrium. 
Skilled and unskilled labors are complements in production, and changes in 
returns to skill stem from changes in the aggregate supply of each kind of 
labor.8 In other words, a large supply of unskilled workers increases the skill 
premium, and vice versa. 
Agents differ across two dimensions: they receive different parental 
transfers, and they are born with different ability levels. Ability is independent 
across generations and is defined as the amount of efficiency units supplied to 
the labor market, regardless of skill level (which, instead, affects the wage 
level at which those units are rewarded). Thus, ability is not genetically 
                                                 
7 Note that these two probabilities may move in opposite directions: a policy that increases 
overall educational achievement may raise upward mobility and reduce downward mobility. 
Thus, we once again run into the problem of clearly defining what we want to include in the 
definition of mobility, or must ask ourselves whether bundling all these phenomena into one 
concept even makes sense. 
8 Underlying this result, there is a neoclassical production function and perfect capital mobility, 
so the marginal productivity of capital is constant.   
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determined and can be likened to “industriousness” (i.e., how hardworking a 
person is). 
The timing is as follows. Individuals can be said to live through two stages. 
In the first, they receive transfers from their parents, then choose an 
educational level, and work. In the second, they consume and leave a bequest 
to their children. 
An individual can acquire skills by buying education at a fixed cost e. If we 
call    
 
 an individual’s ability level and   
  the wage for skill level s, then we 
find that there is an ability threshold above which it pays to become educated.9 
In an efficient outcome, individuals whose ability level exceeds this threshold 
will obtain an education: 
 
  
  
  
  
    
            (8) 
 
However, there are no credit markets available to finance educational 
decisions. This means that parental bequests (x) are the only source of funding.  
Thus, individual resources are given by: 
 
    −          
                    𝑖    
              
 
           
                            𝑡    𝑖          
           (9) 
 
In other words, agents will receive an education only if their bequests 
enable them to afford it. 
Resources are split between individual consumption and bequests to 
children, with   being the weight that is given by parents to bequests. 
 
U  xt 1 , ct 1    ln  xt 1   1   ln ct 1      (10) 
 
 
                                                 
9 Equation (8) also shows that, in equilibrium, skilled wages must be higher than unskilled 
wages.   
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Clearly, in choosing a given bequest level, parents are determining the 
expected value of their children’s education level.  For instance, a bequest 
lower than   ensures that children will be unskilled workers. 
The optimal decisions of each family define, for each distribution of labor 
supply and each level of wages, what the transfers and resulting education 
levels will be for the next generation. The authors look for a steady state of 
this model – a relative wage level and skill distribution such that: families 
expect wages to stay the same and therefore choose transfers in such a way 
that the education distribution remains unchanged; and given the education  
distribution, this wage level is the outcome of market equilibrium. 
In other words, the starting point for the situation is such that the economy 
will remain in the same state indefinitely. 
Owen and Weil find that when individuals face liquidity constraints, there 
are multiple steady-state equilibria which exhibit a positive association 
between equality and mobility. That is, whenever there is high mobility, there 
is low inequality. 
There can, of course, also be a situation in which there is no mobility at all.  
In such a situation, a handful of skilled workers have high wages that enable 
them to educate all of their children while wages for unskilled workers are so 
low that education is not affordable, even for the most industrious families. In 
fact, when the cost of education is high enough, this is the only kind of steady 
state there is.10 
When the cost of education is below a certain ceiling, there is at least one 
high-income, high-mobility equilibrium. In such a situation, the workforce is 
highly educated, which lowers the equilibrium skill wage premium and hence 
the chances that an unskilled worker will find herself limited by her borrowing 
constraint. This not only reduces inequality; it also makes it easier for a high-
ability child of an unskilled worker to receive an education and lowers the 
incentive for a low-ability child of a skilled worker to acquire skills. In other 
words, it raises both upward and downward mobility. 
                                                 
10 There can also be a continuum of this sort of immobile steady state. Starting from any one of 
these states, we can slightly increase the proportion of educated individuals and reduce the 
wage differential accordingly, and we will have another steady state with no mobility. 
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In addition, in these equilibria the allocation of education is more sensitive 
to actual ability and less so to parental background than it is in a more unequal 
economy where borrowing constraints are disproportionately greater for the 
children of low-income parents. This is, in fact, why income is higher, as the 
most industrious workers are in high-productivity positions. 
In low-income societies, these conclusions are reversed: the stock of skills 
is small, the wage differential is high (so is inequality), and mobility is very 
low. As a concequence, the allocation of resources is more inefficient.11 
Thus, credit market imperfections make current skill levels dependent on 
past skill levels, as embodied in parental income. The inefficient steady states 
arise from the fact that this dependence is not based on a productivity 
difference (as would be the case if, for instance, ability were inheritable). 
The key aspect of this model is that these different steady states coexist as 
possible outcomes for the same economy. In other words, two economies 
with the same parameters (access to the same technology, equal weight given 
to children in the utility function) may end up with widely different mobility 
and inequality levels. If it were possible to change the situation in one period 
by means of a single (large-scale) policy intervention, it would become self-
sustainable. In contrast, the interventions required in economies where it is a 
question of changing the fundamentals, such as Becker and Tomes, are 
generally long-term policy measures. 
What would a “one-time” intervention involve? One possibility would be a 
large-scale redistribution of income that could be accomplished either by 
giving funds directly to parents, by giving them “vouchers” for education, or 
by using income tax revenues to subsidize public education – anything that 
would temporarily break the dependence of education on background, thereby 
increasing the supply of educated workers and moving the system toward a 
low-inequality, high-income steady state. 
Other policy recommendations come from “outside” the model. The focus 
on human capital acquisition allows Owen and Weil to consider different 
policy experiments, all of them related to changes in the education system. 
                                                 
11 Note that upward and downward mobility move together when going from one steady state 
to another. This is because we are changing the nature of the equilibrium, and high-
mobility equilibria are more efficient in that they are more sensitive to the actual ability of 
each individual.  
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Given that inefficiencies result from the presence of liquidity constraints, a 
(permanent) program of education loans is the first option considered. The 
authors find that such a program reduces inequality and raises average income, 
effectively moving the economy to a high-education, low-inequality steady 
state. The second policy they analyze is a meritocratic public education 
system, where high-ability individuals get the education that maximizes net 
output. Again, this kind of policy effectively does away with the inefficiencies 
created by the borrowing constraint. Whether this kind of policy is materially 
feasible in low-income, low-mobility countries depends on functional forms 
adopted in the model.12 
Why would the implementation of a meritocratic schooling system be an 
effective policy? The answer is that such a system would tend to wipe out the 
differences in schooling that arise solely by virtue of parental income: in other 
words, for the same reason that we argued that an increase in schooling quality 
would reduce h and therefore increase mobility. Note that this is not an 
abstract consideration. Countries such as China, South Korea and Japan have a 
strong public education sector which uses testing and assessments early on as a 
basis for assigning students to schools and channeling them into careers based 
on their cognitive ability. To a lesser extent, European countries such as 
Germany and France have a strong, high-quality public education sector as 
well. These countries also have greater social mobility than Latin America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 It is even more doubtful whether it would be politically feasible, since in a poor country such 
a measure might entail seizing the entire labor income of an adult generation in order to 
finance education for the young. 
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Table 5. 
Types of policy intervention in Owen and Weil’s model 
 
 
So far, the effects of differences in background are unambiguously 
inefficient. However, this changes when skilled parents transmit advantages 
because they are, in some sense, more efficient than their unskilled 
counterparts. 
 
III.3. Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira: The roles of education and 
technology 
 
Moving on, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2003) present a similar 
setup in which workers may be skilled or unskilled and must finance their 
education without access to a loan market. In their setting, however, different 
agents face different costs of education. In order to become skilled, a child 
needs a certain amount of schooling time, and this is affected by two factors: 
innate ability (which is independent across generations and reduces the time 
needed), and parental background. High-ability individuals need to spend less 
time obtaining formal schooling in order to acquire skills, and the same is true 
for children of skilled parents, who need less outside help in order to achieve 
the same goals, presumably because they have a better understanding of what 
needs to be done and how best to do it. This is an additional, and plausible, 
pathway through which parental background affects children’s well-being. 
There are two alternative technologies in this economy: a constant-returns-
to-scale production sector, where each skilled worker produces output 
 
       Policy           Type of    Intervention 
 
                      Effect within the Model 
 
Massive 
Redistribution 
 
One-Time 
Keeping fundamentals such as education cost the 
same, movement toward a better steady state. 
 
Education Loans 
 
Permanent 
Change  in  fundamentals:  slackens  liquidity 
constraint. Can potentially improve upon the best 
pre-intervention steady state. 
 
 
 
 
Meritocratic Public 
Schooling 
 
 
Permanent 
 
Maximizes  net  output,  breaking  the  link 
between parental income and education. 
 1 
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according to her productivity, and a sector which uses unskilled workers and 
natural resources as inputs (with such resources being assumed to be equally 
divided among unskilled workers). The difference between skilled and 
unskilled workers lies in their productivity, a, which can take two values, as   
as   an, according to the skill level. 
 
     
      
                       (11) 
 
In an equilibrium, skilled workers will earn   , while unskilled workers 
will earn        .
 
 
/
 
, where   is the aggregate stock of natural resources 
and   the aggregate supply of unskilled labor. The income of unskilled 
workers decreases when the aggregate supply of unskilled workers rises (since 
  0,1). 
Teachers are hired to provide this schooling time (i.e., to “produce 
education”) and are paid the skilled-wage rate. Each skilled worker who is 
employed as a teacher produces a certain amount of units of education: h  1. 
This links innate ability and parental background to education costs: the less 
outside time needed for the acquisition of skills, the lower the cost of skill 
acquisition. 
The economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals whose 
lives can be divided into two periods. In the first, they acquire skills. In the 
second, they work, consume, and invest in education for their children. They 
derive utility from their own consumption and from the well-being of their 
offspring13:  
 
Vpar   ln cpar    E Voff         (12)
 
where E is the expectations operator, and V is generational utility. 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that they do not care about the amount of resources spent on their 
children in and of itself, but rather about the result of their expenditure. 
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The process used to model education starts out by specifying innate ability. 
This is indicated by the amount of time that a person would need to be 
educated in order to become skilled, if born to a skilled parent. It is labeled 
inaptitude and denoted by e (and is assumed to be uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1). The educational barrier faced by children of unskilled 
parents is introduced by saying that an individual with inaptitude e needs be 
units of education in order to become skilled if born to an unskilled household, 
with b  1.  Note that when background is introduced in this way, its effect is 
not “inefficient”, since it actually requires more resources to educate 
children from poor families. This differs from the effect of liquidity 
constraints, which are also present in the model and which limit educational 
investment even if it would be efficient to invest in an individual’s education, 
given her innate ability. 
This model has a unique steady state whose equilibrium we will now 
examine. Under this model, parents will choose to invest in their children’s 
education if: 
 
  ( − 𝑖)                      𝑖   
(   )  𝑖       𝑡 𝑖    𝑖    
(    )  𝑖       𝑡 𝑖      𝑖    
      (13)  
 
Because of the structure of preferences, both kinds of parents will choose to 
spend a maximum fraction of their income in education, which we will call 
m.14 This fraction is chosen optimally, given the value of education (i.e., the 
difference in expected welfare between skilled and unskilled individuals). 
In turn, m defines two threshold inaptitude levels, such that parents will 
only invest in education for lower values of e. These thresholds satisfy: 
 
  
 
   𝑚       𝑚
   
 
   𝑚      
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
                   (14) 
 
Where I is the measure of income inequality chosen by the authors, given 
by the ratio between the incomes of skilled and unskilled workers:  
                                                 
14 M is obtained as the solution to ln (1 - m) = β (Vs - Vn). 
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           (15) 
 
Note that, given the distributional assumptions of e, these thresholds give 
the probability that the son of a skilled (or unskilled) worker will be skilled 
and thus serve as indicators of mobility. As expected, the probability that the 
child of an unskilled worker will become skilled is lower than it is for the son 
of a skilled worker. 
Now, we want to solve for the gains to education as a function of the 
fraction of income that is spent in equilibrium in order to solve for the optimal 
m, given the outcomes in the labor market: 
 
  −         . −
 
  
/ ,−   ( − 𝑚) − 𝑚-       (16) 
 
What does equation (16) tell us? The gains from education are increasing in 
inequality. This effect is propagated through a direct channel in the form of 
what could be termed an income effect, but it is also generated by the fact that 
it increases the likelihood that children from skilled backgrounds will be more 
able to afford an education than children from unskilled backgrounds. This 
amplifies the advantage of being born to a skilled parent. We can also see that 
gains from education rise when the share of income that is allotted to 
education increases. 
In order to close the model, we need to know the share of individuals who 
will be unskilled in equilibrium, which will in turn determine relative wages. 
In other words, we need to take into account what happens in the labor market. 
For every ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply, there is a corresponding 
inequality level, which in turn influences the proportion of income that goes 
into education. In a steady state, this ratio will be such that the optimal 
education demands generated will keep the proportions of skilled and 
unskilled unchanged in the following generation. 
Since the model defines a unique steady-state equilibrium, comparative 
statics come from changes in the model parameters. The key finding is that 
there is no unique correlation between inequality and upward mobility 
(measured by the probability that an individual born to an unskilled family will 
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become skilled,   ). As we have previously shown, this level is given by 
   
  ( )
  
, where we have incorporated the fact that the share of income 
going into education is endogenous.  
There are two effects.  Through M  I , inequality tends to raise mobility by 
increasing individuals’ incentives for investment in education. However, there 
is also a negative effect,  which  is  created  by  the  difficulty  of  paying  for  
a  teacher  when  the  wage differential is high. This is the distance effect. At 
low levels of inequality, the incentive effect dominates. When inequality is 
high, the distance effect prevails. 
 
Table 6. 
Effects of an increase in inequality 
 
 
Of course, inequality is endogenous and depends on the labor market’s 
structural conditions. Hence, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira first analyze 
exogenous changes in the production sector. Skill-biased technical change 
raises the wage differential for any given workforce skill composition. This 
kind of change increases the incentive to acquire education, thereby raising the 
proportion of income that goes into education. It also increases inequality, and 
this latter effect acquires greater weight when inequality is already high. In 
other words, skill-biased technical change increases inequality the most in 
economies which were already unequal. The change in mobility mirrors what 
we said above: for low levels of initial inequality, skill-biased technical change 
increases upward mobility; for high levels of inequality, it reduces mobility. 
The second set of exogenous changes that these authors analyze relates to 
the educational sector, that is, changes in h and b. An increase in h, i.e. in the 
overall productivity of education,  has  two  general  equilibrium  effects:  it  
increases  upward  mobility,  and  it reduces  inequality.  A reduction in the 
educational barrier faced by children from unskilled backgrounds, as measured 
by b, has a less clear effect. By making investment by unskilled parents more 
productive, it reduces the fraction of income invested in education across the 
board. This implies greater downward mobility, as children from high-skill 
Low High
Higher Inequality Increases Mobility Reduces Mobility
When initial inequality is
ECONÓMICA 
 
190 
backgrounds become more likely to forgo an education. However, it can still 
be shown that inequality goes down as mobility goes up. 
 
Table 7. 
Effects of policies in the Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira model 
 
 
The last change that is analyzed is the introduction of public education, 
which amounts to a certain level of education, p, being purchased by the 
government (financed by taxes) and given to all children, with parents being 
free to supplement that education with additional outlays.  These authors 
further assume that there is a proportional tax on income, T, and that h equals 
1. With these additions to the original model, the education thresholds are 
modified and turn into:  
 
     𝑚( −  )      
 
 
0  
 
 
( −  )1      (17) 
 
The main point is that skilled parents make more effective use of public 
education. Carrying out a general equilibrium analysis similar to the one used 
in the original model, including the relationship between taxes and the level of 
public education, the authors conclude that an increase in public education 
Inequality Mobility
Increase in
Skilled-biased
technical change
Labor market Increase
Increase
/ Decrease
Reduction in h
Increase in
productivity of
educational system
Decrease Increase
Reduction in b
Reduction in
educational barrier
faced by children
of unskilled parents
Decrease Increase
Public education p
State financing of p
units of education
for every child
Decrease (for 
most parameter 
values)
Increase
Effect onImplemented 
inDescriptionPolicy/Change
Education
sector
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raises upward mobility and, unless both β and b are too close to 1, reduces 
inequality. 
Summarizing the findings in Table 7, we see that, here again, public 
interventions that operate through the educational sector tend to induce a 
virtuous cycle of reduced inequality and increased mobility. However, it is 
possible that higher inequality will be met by higher mobility, particularly 
when the factors driving the increases come from the labor market and are the 
result of changes in technology. 
Although these three models emphasize different aspects of the 
determination of income inequality and intergenerational mobility, they share 
a number of common aspects. The main intuition is that the more parental 
background determines individual outcomes, the more likely it is that 
high inequality will be associated with lower mobility. In Becker and 
Tomes (1979), reducing the degree of inheritability lowers inequality and 
raises mobility, which is effectively the same as reducing the educational 
barriers faced by children of unskilled parents in the Hassler, Rodríguez Mora 
and Zeira (HMZ) (2003) model or relaxing the tightness of the borrowing 
constraint in the Owen and Weil (1998) model. In contrast, when we increase 
incentives to invest in children starting from a relatively equal setup, we may 
find that inequality increases together with mobility. This is what happens 
in the Becker and Tomes model, as well as in the HMZ setup, when skill-
biased technical change increases the incentive to education. 
These models both suggest a natural constraint on how much mobility 
can be changed and point to policies that may affect it. If ability is 
intrinsically inheritable, as is the family endowment in the Becker and Tomes 
model, then it is a source of permanent differences between dynasties and a 
brake on social mobility. However, this also suggests that efforts to “level the 
playing field” through the use of such measures as compulsory and universal 
public  education,  tutoring,  or  early  intervention  programs  may  be 
successful in raising income and social mobility. Given the evidence that there 
is a great deal of scope for early interventions to improve cognitive abilities, 
the assumption that ability is by and large independent across generations but 
that parental background can give children an advantage is probably the most 
relevant for policy purposes. 
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IV.  Inequality and mobility: politico-economic considerations   
 
So far, we have abstracted from the actual workings of governments. A vast 
amount of literature discusses how politico-economic considerations affect the 
distribution of income, as well as social mobility, when considered 
intertemporally. We will now discuss these kinds of results. 
At this point, we are mainly interested in the association between inequality 
and mobility, rather than in the politico-economic consequences of mobility 
per se (which we deal with in a separate section). The main findings discussed 
in the literature are summarized in Benabou (1996). 
This author sets up an overlapping generation’s model in which generations 
within a dynasty are not altruistic toward each other. The utility of each 
generation is given by:  
 
  
      
       
                     (18)
              
where c is consumption when young and d is consumption when old. People 
are endowed with resources w distributed independently and identically across 
dynasties. These resources can  be  invested  in  capital  and  used  to  generate  
second-period  income, according to the technology used: 
 
  
   (  
 )
 
(  )
            (19)
          
where k is the amount of the investment and wt is the average level of 
resources in the community. Given that there are imperfect capital markets, k 
is limited by individual resources – that is,        . 
The linkage between generations comes through this resource level, which 
can be interpreted as the endowment of basic skills: skills possessed by young 
agents are derived from the interaction between parents’ incomes as adults – 
determined by their own skill level – and innate ability, which is independent 
across generations.  Thus: 
 
    
      
   
                (20)
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There is a political element in the model which comes in the form of 
income taxation and redistribution before individual investment decisions are 
made. For convenience, the author adopts a log-linear specification, whereby 
post-redistribution income is given by: 
 
 ̂ 
  (  
 )
   
( ̃ )
          (21)
       
where    is determined by budget balance. The tax scheme is progressive 
when    (   and regressive when    . The tax rate results from the 
workings of the political process. In order to incorporate the possibility of 
systems or societies with different levels of wealth bias, Benabou introduces 
the variable p, which indicates the position in the wealth distribution of the 
pivotal voter. Higher p implies higher wealth bias. When a system displays a 
pro-poor bias, in the sense that the pivotal voter is poorer than the mean, the 
economy converges toward a unique steady state. The stronger the populist 
bias, the higher redistribution and mobility are and the lower after-tax 
inequality is. Thus, we see an inverse relation between inequality and 
mobility, as greater equality is associated with higher mobility, which in   
this case is induced by political considerations. 
When a system exhibits a pro-rich bias, however, multiple steady states 
are possible. Equilibria with low redistribution have high (after-tax) 
inequality and lower mobility. They are also less efficient than equilibria 
with higher redistribution. Thus, we again find that inequality and mobility 
are inversely correlated. Both are jointly determined by the nature of the 
political system, which in turn affects the cross-sectional wealth distribution, 
and by the degree to which it persists from generation to generation. 
 
V.  Meritocracy, opportunity, mobility and efficiency 
 
As a means of transitioning to our discussion of mobility and its economic 
consequences and correlates, we survey a set of models that point to its 
interrelationship within an economic context, as well as its efficiency 
consequences, while keeping the normative concern present. 
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The Size of the Pie 
Benabou (2000) provides a general framework for an explicit examination 
of the links among these four notions. In a model very similar to those we have 
discussed, he starts by assuming that individual pre-tax income reflects both 
social background and personal characteristics. As a first approximation, these 
personal characteristics are assumed to be distributed independently from 
social background and to represent “ability”.  At this point, he equates equality 
of opportunity with meritocracy (under the common heading “meritocracy in 
opportunities”) and identifies it with the share of total income variance that 
comes from variability in individual traits. 
Granting that the assumption of independence between individual traits and 
social background is not quite realistic, he redefines meritocracy in 
opportunities as the share of total variance in pre-tax income that is 
“unexpected” given social background. That is, he measures how much of 
current income is not dependent on parental status and the like, but instead on 
other autonomous factors. Insofar as these factors reflect variability in personal 
choice, effort, and so forth, this definition arguably comes closer to an actual 
meritocracy than the first one. 
A related idea in this context is that, in a meritocracy, individual outcomes 
should also differ – in the sense that after-tax incomes should not be 
completely equalized. In other words, the existence of a meritocracy should 
imply some sort of incentive system whereby good actions get higher rewards. 
Thus, it should also be the case that “luck” or talent is effectively rewarded 
even after taking into account any fiscal redistribution – what Benabou terms 
“inequality of outcomes”. 
 
Table 8. 
Aspects of meritocracy 
 
    Societal Outcome Definition                                 Environment 
Meritocracy in 
opportunities 
Degree to which market outcomes are 
unrelated to social background, explained 
by personal choices or characteristics 
Market, Pre-tax 
Inequality of outcomes 
Degree to which effective income is 
determined by individual talent and 
abilities 
After-tax 
    1 
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Both of these societal attributes are desirable, but they are not logically 
connected; it is quite possible that a society may be very meritocratic in its 
market opportunities, but that it fully redistributes income, so that effective 
outcomes are equalized. At the same time, whether inequality of outcomes is 
desirable clearly depends on whether opportunities have been allocated fairly. 
This consideration leads to the formulation of a two- dimensional measure of 
meritocracy – a “meritocracy utility function” – which expresses an ordering 
of all possible combinations of equal opportunity and unequal outcomes.15 
This makes the relationship between these two notions explicit. In 
particular, this measurement should reflect the fact that, as opportunities 
become more equal, inequality in outcomes is more acceptable (even 
desirable) and that as outcome inequality rises, the value of additional equality 
of opportunity increases. 
What about the rewards to effort? In an argument that echoes Roemer 
(1998), Benabou claims that differences in the level of effort “must ultimately 
reflect different (perceived) returns to effort, hence differences in either 
background or ability”. Thus, the degree to which increased rewards to effort 
lead to improvements in terms of an overall meritocracy would depend on the 
extent to which attitudes toward effort are shaped by family background. If the 
influence of this factor is high, then equality of opportunity will be reduced 
(although an increase in rewards to effort will certainly raise the inequality of 
outcomes). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 As a technical note, the function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, with a 
positive cross- derivative, and quasi-concave. The value of the function is minimal when 
either dimension tends to zero: an aristocracy, if there is no meritocracy in opportunity, or a 
mediocracy if all post-tax incomes are perfectly equalized. 
ECONÓMICA 
 
196 
Table 9. 
Effects of rewards to effort in terms of meritocracy 
 
 
When considering policies from an intertemporal, long-run point of view, it 
becomes apparent  that  tradeoffs  are  inevitable;  most  policies  will  affect  
both  dimensions  in different directions. Consider a policy that redistributes 
income: it reduces inequality of outcomes, but it increases equality of 
opportunity in the following generation, as deviations from mean market 
income are less likely to come from differences in parental background. To 
understand these effects more fully, the author presents a model of infinitely-
lived dynasties. 
Each generation is born with a certain level of human capital, which 
depends both on random luck (independent across generations) and on the 
individuals’ parents, through their realized level of human capital and through 
an educational choice as well. That is, we assume that skills are hereditary to 
some level, but that they are also affected by education. Each generation must 
choose three quantities: labor supply (which is costly in terms of utility but 
increases pre-tax income), own consumption16, and education for the next 
generation. There are no capital markets, so education and consumption must 
be financed by current income. Current income depends on the level of the 
labor supply and on human capital. Income is taxed and redistributed, which 
means that taxes can relax the liquidity constraint for families with small 
human-capital endowments. 
                                                 
16 An overlapping generational interpretation would include “children’s” consumption. 
Outcome Effect 
Meritocracy in opportunities Depends on factors affecting costs and 
returns to effort: if these factors depend in 
parental characteristics, an increase in 
rewards to effort would reduce the 
meritocracy of opportunity 
Inequality of outcomes As long as there are any differences in 
effort level, inequality of outcomes will 
increase with rewards to effort 
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Because of these credit-market imperfections, income inequality is 
associated with lower output growth. However, starting from a given level of 
inequality, the tax rate that maximizes current growth is lower than the rate 
that maximizes the long-run level of income.17 Intuitively, we know that 
redistributing today reduces the current incentive to work but also induces 
growth further in the future, since it reduces inequality in all subsequent 
periods by shifting income to liquidity-constrained households. 
How do equality of opportunities and inequality of outcomes appear in this 
model? The former is a measure of social mobility, and it decreases when the 
relative importance of education and parental human capital in the 
determination of current human capital are high, as well as with the 
importance of skills in the labor market. It increases, on the other hand, with 
the level of redistribution. Inequality of outcomes, by contrast, increases with 
the importance of skills and decreases with redistribution. 
 
Table 10. 
Impact of Parameters in terms of Meritocracy 
 
 
What is their impact on growth and long-run output? On the one hand, 
inequality of outcomes increases incentives to work, thereby raising overall 
                                                 
17 Throughout the discussion, it is assumed that the tax rate is the same in every period. 
 
Parameter Effect of an Increase in the Parameter 
 
Impact of education on current 
human capital 
Reduces meritocracy in 
opportunities in the presence of 
liquidity constraints 
Impact of parental human 
capital 
on current human 
capital 
Reduces meritocracy in 
opportunities 
 
Market return to acquired skills 
Reduces meritocracy in 
opportunities 
Increases inequality of outcomes 
 
Extent of redistribution 
Increases meritocracy in 
opportunities 
Reduces inequality of outcomes 
 1 
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efficiency. Equality of opportunity is also efficient, as it tends to reduce the 
growth losses that operate through income inequality, i.e. through differential 
access to education. However, the extent to which this aspect of meritocracy 
goes hand in hand with efficiency is limited, as reducing disparities in access 
to education also decreases the efficiency gains to be derived from a level of 
education that is more productive for the offspring of highly skilled 
individuals. 
In summary, meritocracy and efficiency are closely related when capital 
markets are imperfect, but their correlation depends on how parental 
background affects the productivity of investments that raise income.18 In 
addition, meritocracy has two distinct aspects, equality of opportunity and 
inequality of outcomes, and a normative ordering should incorporate both 
dimensions. By and large, social mobility, equality of opportunity and 
meritocracy in general tend to increase efficiency in economies with limited 
access to education finance. 
 
Inequality of opportunity and the need to provide incentives 
A related approach is developed in Phelan (2006).  He argues that in a 
dynamic contracting model with unobservable effort where agents demand 
incentives not to shirk, it is efficient to have both unequal opportunity and 
social mobility. In other words, agents born into families with high realized 
output should enjoy higher income (unequal opportunity) but, over time, all 
dynasties should have a positive probability of changing positions in the 
income ranking (social mobility). 
In this model, there is a continuum of dynasties, each composed of a 
generation that lives for one period. Production depends on effort: if a 
household exerts effort a a0 , …, aN  , then output q q0 ,… , qN  occurs with 
a probability p q | a   0. Intuitively, low outcomes are more likely when 
effort is low, while high outcomes are more likely when effort is high. 
Households receive an “allocation” of effort (i.e., they are told what effort 
                                                 
18 This suggests the possibility that breaking the link between parental background and the 
productivity of education enhances efficiency and mobility. Cunha et al. (2005) argue that 
this is what early childhood interventions do. 
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
level to exert), but this effort level is not observable. In other words, 
households can claim to exert a certain level of effort, but may actually shirk 
instead. 
Household utility in one period is given by: 
 
U ct , at   u ct   v at                     (23) 
 
where c is consumption in one period and U is increasing in consumption and 
strictly decreasing in effort. A household cares about the expected value of the 
average discounted payoffs, ( −  ) ∑  𝑡 ( 𝑡  𝑡) 𝑡  . 
As we have said, this is a dynamic contracting model. A planner designing 
this dynamic social contract must choose the best among all feasible 
allocations. What are “allocations” in this context? Formally, allocations 
specify an initial distribution of promises of lifetime utilities, 0, a sequence 
of effort allocations for each level of promised expected utility, *  (  )+    , a 
sequence of consumption allocations for each level of observed output and 
promised expected utility, *  (     )+    , and a sequence of “promises” or 
“continuation values” for every realization of output and initial promise, 
*    (      )+   
 . In other words, it starts by specifying how “rich” (in 
terms of utility) a family can expect to be over its members’ lifetimes and then 
provides a rule specifying how much effort a generation must exert.  Next, for 
each possible realization of outcome, it states how much will be consumed at 
that time and how much will be “inherited” by the generations to follow in the 
form of “promised” utility. 
For an allocation to be feasible, it must: deliver on its promises: the 
expected utility arising from following the allocation starting at time t with a 
promised utility wt must equal wt, so that the outcome does not depend on 
people being systematically wrong about their prospects,19 it must provide the 
right incentives: if an allocation calls for a certain level of effort, that effort 
should be optimal for the household in expected terms, so that its members 
will freely choose it from among all possible alternatives,20  and it must respect 
                                                 
19 Formally     ∑  (     (  ))[( −  )( (  (     )) −  (  (  )))       (     )]   
20 Formally     ∑  (    ̂ )[( −  )( (  (     )) −  (  ))       (     )]   
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
the resource constraint: the amounts consumed in each realization of aggregate 
output must not exceed that output.21 
There are many different allocations that satisfy these three conditions, 
which mean we must have some criterion we can use to choose among them. 
Phelan first recasts the problem as one of several individuals who are linked to 
each other by some sort of altruism. Their individual welfare therefore 
depends both on the existing level of utility when they are alive and on the 
promised utility to their descendants. In other words: 
 
   ∑  (     (  )),( −  ) (  (     )   (  ))       (     )-     (24) 
 
This is a reinterpretation of the previous model, with identical formal 
results. The advantage of thinking through the problem in this way is that it 
suggests a criterion which can be used to rank feasible allocations. The author 
argues that the correct welfare criterion is the average welfare of all 
generations, across both time and dynasties. This departs from the traditional 
criterion, which maximizes a weighted average of ( −  )∑    (         ), 
the “per generation” utility of a dynasty at time zero, where the average is over 
dynasties. The argument backing up this change is that the traditional 
formulation, which has appeared in several previous papers, puts no weight on 
the welfare of subsequent generations.22 
The author shows that the optimal allocation under this criterion exhibits 
both unequal opportunities and social mobility. 
Unequal opportunities are reflected in the fact that dynastic utility during 
every period tends toward a limiting yet variable distribution (at every point in 
time, some people will be born with lower expected welfare than others). 
These disadvantaged individuals will be those born into dynasties with low 
realized output in the past. This is a consequence of the need to provide 
incentives for agents to expend effort. In other words, since incentive 
constraints are binding, a way to relax them – i.e. to provide incentives in a 
                                                 
21 Formally   ∫ ∑  (     (  )),(  (     ) −   )-      (  ) where  
       * ( ) −  (  )    + and C is the consumption set. 
22 Formally, a planner must choose a dynamic allocation that maximizes 
             
 
   
∑    
 
    where     ∫       (  ). 
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more efficient way – is to make the utility of generations down the line (which 
current generations care about, as they are altruistic) dependent on current 
output. In other words, it pays to have parents who are able to provide lifetime 
advantages to their children. 
Social mobility is associated with the fact that an individual is born with a 
given expected dynastic utility does not preclude him from moving up or down 
in this distribution as periods go by. In fact, this is bound to happen. In 
particular, there are no castes (i.e., income groups whose composition does not 
change over time). This effectively means that, eventually, all dynasties will 
have a chance of changing their ranking, no matter where their starting point 
is. 
What is remarkable about this result is how it relates to the veil of 
ignorance under which allocations are to be judged, according to philosophers 
whose postulates can be traced back to John Rawls. This is an optimal 
allocation in the sense that it would be chosen by an individual who does not 
know which dynasty or generation she will be born into. Even so, and despite 
the fact that all agents are ex-ante equal, the optimal arrangement exhibits 
inequality of opportunity. In addition, it features social mobility as a 
characteristic of an optimal arrangement, thereby pointing to its efficiency. 
This result treats all agents as perfectly identical in terms of the income 
opportunities they face, at least in the initial period. This should be borne in 
mind, since no information is provided as to what should be done if these 
opportunities were to differ by dynasty. 
 
Intelligence, mobility and efficiency 
So far, all the models we have discussed relate to earnings mobility for 
workers. A different case in which meritocracy may relate to higher efficiency 
and mobility is modeled by Hassler and Mora (2000), who consider the social 
mechanisms that allocate agents to occupational  categories: entrepreneurs vs. 
workers. They define “intelligence” as “what you use when you don’t know 
what to do”, borrowing from Jean Piaget, and explore the link between 
intelligence and entrepreneurship in high- and low-growth environments. 
In their model, individuals are born with a given level of intelligence, 
which is less than perfectly correlated with their parents and with a stock of 
social assets that is fully determined by their background. They interpret 
ECONÓMICA 
 
202 
meritocracy as the degree to which social positions are influenced by innate 
intelligence as opposed to background (note how this relates closely to the 
“equality of opportunity” aspect of meritocracy defined by Benabou, 2000). In 
this model, a higher degree of meritocracy implies higher mobility, since 
innate traits are less correlated across generations than social background is. 
Individuals, then, must choose whether to become entrepreneurs or 
workers. The latter earn a fixed economy - wide competitive wage, wt, which 
is fully known at the time of the decision, whereas entrepreneurial income 
depends on the ability to forecast the value of a random variable, interpreted as 
the “correct” decision.23 Entrepreneurs hire a certain number of workers, lt, 
and choose a as close as possible to a stochastic process xt. Profits are given 
by: 
 
∏    (    )
 
.      
  ⁄ −    /       (25)
           
For any rational choice of l, profits are maximized by correctly predicting 
x. Individuals have a certain  belief as  to  the true value of  xt,  which  they 
assume to  be normally distributed with mean   j and variance 1/ P  j  .  
The  authors  show  that  regardless  of  their  beliefs,  all  entrepreneurs  
will  demand    .
   
  
/
 
workers. The best action a, on the other hand, will 
depend on those beliefs and in this case, will be a    j . Given this, the 
expected utility24 of agent j if she becomes an entrepreneur depends crucially 
on the precision of her belief and equals:25 
 
  ( )        ∏      −     −
 
 ( )
      (26)
             
                                                 
23 This decision changes from period to period; in the real world, it would be a 
multidimensional object indicating the “best way” to run a firm. 
24  We are assuming a log utility function. 
25  “Precision” is defined as the inverse of the variance of a random variable. 
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If the agent chooses to become a worker instead, utility is no longer 
stochastic.  Instead, it is fully known before the decision and equals ln wt. Note 
that this implies that expected profits must be higher than wages, and we can 
therefore think of entrepreneurs as “rich”. 
Agents choose the occupation that offers a higher expected utility, which is 
determined by a threshold degree of accuracy in their beliefs about the true 
state of the world. Agents with a high degree of accuracy end up being 
entrepreneurs, while agents with a lower level of accuracy choose to become 
workers. In other words, an agent will choose to be an entrepreneur if: 
 
                          ( )             ( )
      −     −
 
 ( )
        
                                ( )      
 
 (       )
                                              (27)
                 
This shows that the process that determines such beliefs will be the driving 
force behind the “class structure” in this model. Entrepreneurial activities will 
be the domain of people with access to high-quality information. Workers will 
be those with higher variance in their beliefs about the way the world 
functions. 
Technology is a pair r, xrthat follows an exogenous stochastic process in 
continuous time (specifically, a Brownian motion). For the initial analysis, 
technological growth is exogenous and follows: 
 
        ∫ √   
 
 
         (28) 
 
where dz is a standard Wiener increment. In particular, by setting the 
exogenous rate of technological growth between periods to g, we obtain: 
 
        √             (29)
         
ECONÓMICA 
 
204 
with    a standard normal, independent over time. Note that    can be 
interpreted as the amount of information needed to keep up with the new 
technology and suggests that, at times of high rates of technological growth, 
the “best way” to run a firm may vary widely from one period to the next. The 
key issue now is: how beliefs about x are formed. 
Each individual has two sources of private information, neither of which he 
can trade or transfer. First, he obtains an unbiased signal about      from his 
parents. Depending on social background, the signal will vary and will be 
more or less precise: children of entrepreneurs will get to know the exact value 
of     , whereas children of worker families will have an unbiased signal of  
      with identical variance   0.  
A second source is the individual’s cognitive ability, or intelligence.26 Each 
individual is born with an unbiased signal of x. Individuals differ in the 
precision of their signal, which may take on one of two values, the higher of 
which corresponds to highly intelligent individuals. Specifically, the precision 
for low-intelligence individuals is 1, while for high-intelligence individuals it 
is   1. Intelligence is independent across individuals and along generations. 
Individuals are rational Bayesian agents, and they update their prior signal 
based on both sources. The resulting precision levels are: 
 
Table 11. 
 
 
There are two sources of increased precision. Knowledge of the past 
realization is useful in constructing a forecast. Individuals from all groups use 
this knowledge, but those from working-class backgrounds start off with worse 
                                                 
26 We omit the lengthy discussion presented in the original paper about what the politically 
(and biologically) correct term is for the ability to make good decisions in uncertain 
environments with less than perfect information. 
 Family Background 
  Entrepreneur Worker 
 
Intelligence 
High 1
  
+   
1
 +   
+   
Low 1
  
+ 1 
1
 +   
+ 1 
 1 
SOCIAL MOBILITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
 
 
205 
information. This is captured in Table 11 by the fact that  
  
 
 
    
. Both 
groups have to deal with the fact that the accuracy of this forecast will depend 
on how fast the environment is changing. A second source of increased 
precision is individual intelligence. Our interest in this “precision” stems from 
its role in determining the class structure. We should keep in mind that, in an 
equilibrium, there should always be both entrepreneurs and workers. This 
means that agents with the lowest signals (in this case, low-intelligence 
individuals from working-class backgrounds) will be workers. 
By the same token, high- intelligence individuals from entrepreneurial 
families have the best information and thus will be entrepreneurs. The 
threshold level will be somewhere in between, and the ordering between high-
intelligence working-class individuals and low-intelligence entrepreneurial-
class persons depends on the model’s parameters. 
For meaningful possibilities of social mobility and meritocracy, therefore, 
the key inequality is whether a highly intelligent agent from a working-class 
background will have higher precision (and, thus, a higher probability of 
choosing to be an entrepreneur) than a low-intelligence individual from an 
entrepreneurial family. For high enough values of   , which measures the 
pace of change in the economic environment, this will indeed be the case, as 
the value of past information becomes negligible in comparison to 
understanding current conditions. 
In fact, when these authors study the steady state of this model,27 they find 
that the parameters that explain whether there is intergenerational mobility 
depend on    and on the distribution of intelligence (specifically on the  
proportion of highly intelligent individuals that are born in each generation, q). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 In the steady state, the proportion of entrepreneurs and workers is kept constant. 
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Table 12. 
Factors affecting social mobility 
 
  
When the environment is not very complex (   is low), there can be no 
social mobility in a steady state. Why? For a society to be in a steady state, the 
proportion of entrepreneurs must remain the same. Yet, in order for there to be 
some degree of social mobility, some children from working-class families 
must become entrepreneurs. As we have argued, these children must be those 
with high intelligence. 
In low-complexity environments  
    
   
 
  
  , if high-intelligence 
individuals from working-class families choose to become entrepreneurs (a 
necessary condition for mobility), so will low-intelligence individuals from 
entrepreneurial families. But if this were the case, then the share of 
entrepreneurs would increase (it would include all former entrepreneurs, plus 
at least some of the highly intelligent individuals from working-class families), 
thus creating a situation that departs from a steady state. Consequently, any 
steady state in a low-complexity society will involve social immobility. 
Model 
Parameter 
Interpretation Effects on 
Social Mobility 
                           Pathway 
 
 
 
𝛿  
 
Pace of change 
in the economic 
environment, 
complexity 
 
Higher 𝛿   
leads to higher 
mobility 
Intelligence becomes more decisive in the 
occupational decision. When 1
 +𝛿 
+  >
1
𝛿 
+ 1, smart children from working class 
families become entrepreneurs, “replacing” 
low/intelligence children from 
entrepreneurial families. 
 
 
 
q 
 
Proportion of 
highly 
intelligent 
individuals in 
the population 
 
In high 
complexity 
environments,  
a very large or 
very small q 
leads to lower 
mobility 
When q is too large, some of the less 
intelligent agents from entrepreneurs in an 
equilibrium. Thus, some of the intelligent 
persons from working-class households will 
remain workers. 
When q is too small, some of the less 
intelligent agents from entrepreunerial 
families will become entrepreneurs. 
Thus, extreme levels of q induce a high 
degree of dependence for individual 
outcomes on initial family conditions. 
 1 
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What happens in high-complexity environments? This depends on q. In 
general, in these environments it is relatively hard to be a successful 
entrepreneur, and inherited information has little value. This leads intelligent 
individuals to choose to become entrepreneurs. Will the set of highly 
intelligent individuals coincide with the set of entrepreneurs? This would 
indicate both mobility and meritocracy, but the answer depends on the 
parameters. For instance, q could be so large that if all highly intelligent 
individuals were to become entrepreneurs, their income relative to wages 
would be too low, and some might choose to be workers instead (and the ones 
who would make that choice would be from working-class families). 
Alternatively, q could be low, making wages too low and inducing (some of) 
the low-intelligence agents from entrepreneurial families to become 
entrepreneurs themselves. 
Therefore, in highly complex societies, there will always be a greater 
degree of meritocracy, in the sense that entrepreneurs will be more 
intelligent than the population as a whole. However, the degree of mobility 
will depend on the proportion of intelligent individuals. A large proportion of 
intelligent individuals reduces downward mobility, thus increasing the extent 
of dependence between past and current outcomes. 
These authors add one last twist: technological growth may be partly 
related to investments undertaken by entrepreneurs. In this case, individuals 
who choose to be entrepreneurs can also choose whether to innovate; in other 
words, they choose their own level of g. Higher levels of g increase both the 
mean and the variance of expected profits and are best used by intelligent 
individuals. The authors show that the level of innovation will not depend on 
social background, but rather on intelligence alone. As before, whenever a 
low-intelligence individual chooses to become an entrepreneur, so will a high-
intelligence agent from the same background. Also, whenever an individual 
from a working-class background finds it profitable to become an 
entrepreneur, so will an individual from an entrepreneurial background. 
The end result is that, in this case, there will in general be two steady states. 
In one of them, there is no mobility and little innovation, since innovation is 
driven by intelligent individuals only. In the other, intelligent individuals from 
both classes become entrepreneurs in any generation, and so technology (and, 
therefore, output) grows, thus increasing the degree of meritocracy and making 
mobility possible. 
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The policy implications of this model are not absolutely clear. We may 
think that, starting from a rigid society, opening up to competition and 
technological adoption will tend to reduce the “informational advantages” that 
are inherited by children of entrepreneurial families. This model abstracts from 
failures in the credit market, so there is no role for policies in tackling this 
issue. However, if it were a case of potential entrepreneurs from working-class 
families facing some sort of credit constraint, there could be room for 
incentives for research and innovation that would more than likely be used by 
intelligent, as opposed to well-off, individuals. 
Finally, a note of caution is warranted regarding these policy prescriptions, 
which amount to making the economic climate more “challenging” –for 
instance, by opening up to international trade and foreign technological 
progress– so that “inherited” knowledge is not useful in determining outcomes. 
This, however, may make for a tough transition, as entrepreneurs make 
initially bad decisions that drive down real wages for the economy as a whole. 
It is not clear how to fit education into the model. One interesting way in 
which it might work with the model would be if it increases the precision of 
the private, innate signal of each individual. In other words, if it increases 
intelligence. There does not seem to be any sort of consensus on this point, 
however, particularly since there is little evidence that education, other than at 
a very early age, actually changes cognitive ability. Also, if this were the 
channel through which education acted, it would likely do relatively little to 
reduce the barrier between the rich and the poor; consequently, starting from a 
situation with no mobility, it would not erase the advantage of a low-
intelligence individual from an entrepreneurial family, as he would now also 
be more intelligent. 
However, it may be that education acts through another channel.  It might 
provide more information about past environments, therefore directly reducing 
the advantage enjoyed by children in entrepreneurial families. This second role 
could potentially move a society away from a steady state of perfect 
immobility by providing intelligent agents from working-class families with an 
extra edge. 
Thus,  in  short,  although  we  may  think  equality  of  opportunity  or  
meritocracy  are desirable  attributes  in  a  society,  they  bear  no  necessary  
connection  to  economic efficiency. In many cases, they are positively related, 
but in these cases the mechanism seems to go from economic efficiency to 
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opportunity or meritocracy and mobility. This is particularly true when 
economies have imperfect market arrangements that create room for 
efficiency-enhancing policies – namely, when imperfect capital markets 
preclude individuals from fully realizing their potential human capital and 
skills. 
 
VI.  Effects of social mobility 
 
We will now elaborate upon our line of reasoning in arguing that mobility 
may be a necessary feature of an efficient economic system. As we have 
suggested, it is hard to argue, from a purely economic point of view, that 
mobility should be a goal in and of itself, as opposed to being the consequence 
of efficiency-enhancing policies involving human capital accumulation.  
However, when we add a political dimension to the analysis, we find that 
mobility may have consequences per se, as it adds an extra dimension to 
distributional conflict. Lastly, we will see that the relevant effect does not 
derive from the actual income process, but rather stems from the perception 
that agents have of it, which informs their position in the political arena. 
  
Economic efficiency 
At this point, we have briefly gone through most of the main body of the 
economic literature relating to social mobility and economic performance. We 
will now summarize the key findings, without going into the specific details of 
each particular model. 
The main conclusion, as set forth in Becker and Tomes (1979), Owen and 
Weil (1998), and Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2002), is that whenever 
liquidity constraints prevent individuals from acquiring an efficient level of 
human capital, social mobility is limited and economic efficiency is reduced. 
In such cases, redistribution helps ease the liquidity constraint and increases 
long-term mobility. 
When markets are complete, however, social mobility may be low 
(equivalently, the effects of different initial conditions may be persistent), but 
efficiency considerations do not justify interventions – only equity concerns 
provide a reason to redistribute. A number of these models can be found in 
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Piketty (2000). He identifies two main reasons for “persistent inequality” with 
complete markets. 
The first is the intergenerational transmission of financial assets in a model 
where income is determined by labor supply and returns on wealth: 
 
Yit   vt ait   rt wit           (30) 
 
where a is ability that is rewarded in the labor market at rate v, and rw is 
capital income, r is the interest rate and w the stock of inherited wealth. 
Without any behavioral assumption, income inequality will be greater than the 
inequality of labor earnings, unless a (which is taken to be exogenous) and w 
are negatively correlated. This is a feature observed in empirical studies. 
If we assume further that bequeathed wealth is an increasing function of 
income, then one can see that income disparities are persistent even if labor 
income is fully equalized (with a set at 1 for everyone). This is indeed what 
motivates our study of mobility. The further insight, which is also borne out by 
available empirical evidence, is that when assets can be bequeathed, income is 
likely to be more closely correlated intergenerationally than labor earnings. 
 
yi t 1   vt   rt 1S ( yit )         (31) 
 
As Piketty illustrates, initial differences in asset holdings will only be 
equalized in the long run if savings are a concave fraction of income, labor 
earnings are the same for every individual, and fertility behavior is the same 
for every family. A departure from any of these assumptions (by positing that 
families endogenously determine their bequests, for instance, or that there is a 
degree of heterogeneity in family size which affects the potential for leaving 
bequests) leads to persistent wealth inequalities in the long run. In the case of 
differential fertility behavior, for example if dynasty i has 1  ni children, 
then the transition for individual wealth is: 
 
       
 (      ) (   )  
    
                     (32) 
 
SOCIAL MOBILITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
 
 
211 
Consequently, different dynasties may end up having different steady states 
of wealth. This will be the case if poor families tend to have more children. 
Piketty argues that, within this framework, inheritance taxation is the most 
effective policy instrument. Of course, in any but the simplest model, such 
taxation would have to be a permanent feature of the economy.28 The 
distortionary consequences of this type of taxation clearly depend on the 
driving forces behind inheritance. If bequests are mainly accidental by-
products of precautionary saving, then taxing them has no obvious cost. 
However, if they are the product of intergenerational altruism, the 
distortionary effect is more likely to be negative. The strength of this  
conclusion,  however,  depends  on particular  assumptions  as  to  the  precise  
reason  why  bequests  are  left.  It makes a difference, for instance, whether  it 
is bequests per se that affect parental utility, or whether there is a “dynastic 
utility function” that each generation maximizes. In fact, inheritance taxation 
can potentially increase long-run wealth disparities. These results lead Piketty 
to quote Mulligan (1997): “much more research (…) [is] necessary to arrive at 
a strong conclusion regarding the unimportance of  taxes  for  intergenerational 
mobility”. 
A second (efficient) reason for persistent inequality is family inheritance of 
ability and tastes. Piketty uses a very simple reduced-form model, similar to 
the one employed by Becker and Tomes (1979), and stresses the fact that 
intergenerational transmission of ability works at least as much through family 
environment and learning as it does through genetic transmission. As we have 
repeatedly argued, this intergenerational transmission reduces mobility. Piketty 
considers the question of what sort of policies could break down this 
transmission.  He concludes that if capital markets are indeed perfect and this 
persistence of ability is therefore efficient, then any public intervention would 
compound the problem, as it would make high-ability families even better off 
by covering part of the cost of human-capital acquisition, while overall levels 
would not be changed. Again, even if one were to argue that redistribution in 
this context is desirable on purely ethical grounds (based on an appeal for 
equality of opportunity, for instance), the consequences of a redistributive 
                                                 
28 For a non-permanent tax rate, we would need a situation where a one-time equalizing tax 
leaves the economy in a steady state. But, of course, this means that equal wealth was a steady 
state to begin with, and this is true only in models with few sources of heterogeneity in economic 
behavior. 
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policy are far from obvious, since we do not know much about the magnitude 
of the incentive effects of earnings taxes. 
A similar concern is raised by persistence in social outcomes that is 
explained by differences in tastes, given the fact that individuals measure 
themselves against reference groups and low-income individuals have low-
income reference groups. In this and other similar models, where individuals 
are somehow responsible for their own misfortune, it is quite hard to come up 
with acceptable policy interventions. In a sense, it implies that perfect social 
mobility is not efficient. 
A related connection between efficiency and mobility is given when 
parental background acts as an input in the production of human capital and 
the acquisition of skills. That is, higher-income families make better use of the 
resources at their disposal to educate their children. This is a feature of 
Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira (2003), Raut (1996), and Benabou (2000). 
The relevant tradeoff is then between the fact that educating the children of the 
rich is relatively cheaper and the potential output that is lost because high-
ability children born into poor families do not receive an education that fully 
develops their ability. This is true under imperfect capital markets, but also 
under no liquidity constraints: if ability is correlated across generations, then 
reducing the educational advantage of high-income families helps make low-
income/high-ability dynasties into high-income/high-ability families. This 
tradeoff is at the heart of Benabou’s argument. 
Hassler and Mora (2000) make a related point, noting that the advantage 
enjoyed by rich entrepreneurial parents is fully inefficient, in that society 
would be better off in the long run if these advantages were not strong 
determinants of economic position. However, it remains true, even in this 
model, that the children of parents with a strong informational advantage will 
be entrepreneurs. The downside is that this kind of informational advantage is 
most likely to be relevant in situations marked by low growth and low levels 
of long-run output. 
Overall, then, efficiency does not seem to be determined by mobility – 
rather, it seems to be a jointly determined result. The relation is at its strongest 
when there are liquidity constraints that prevent agents from making efficient 
investments in their stock of human capital. However, there are constraints on 
what level of social mobility is efficient, as, even in contexts of perfect 
availability of financing opportunities, there would be some intergenerational 
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persistence, and in many cases the appeal to policies that increase social 
mobility stems from the belief that it is in itself a desirable feature of the 
income process. 
 
Political outcomes 
So far, we have taken an approach in which redistribution is analyzed 
insofar as it relates to efficiency, without focusing on the degree to which it is 
more or less likely that redistribution will come about. This aspect is the main 
contribution of the models we will analyze in this section. 
The first finding, which has been widely cited, points to a direct connection 
between income mobility and redistribution when individuals care about their 
own interests only. This is the formalization by Benabou and Ok (2001a) of 
the “Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis. This is a customary 
answer to the question as to why low- income voters may oppose substantial 
redistribution and is based on the idea that they may “take into account the fact 
that they, or their children, may move up in the income distribution and 
therefore be hurt by such policies”. Three assumptions underlie this 
hypothesis:   
First, policies are persistent, so that what is decided today is expected to 
remain in place for a number of periods. Second, agents are not too risk-
averse, since otherwise they would favor the income- smoothing possibilities 
provided by redistribution. And finally, individual families who are currently 
poorer than average (and therefore would be among the beneficiaries of 
redistribution) expect to become richer than average. 
The usual assumption has been that this last condition cannot exist in 
situations where agents have rational expectations. This paper shows that this 
is not the case. 
The setting is one where income is strictly exogenous and follows some 
given stochastic process. Agents are allowed to vote on a flat, proportional tax 
rate, the proceeds of which accrue to each citizen in equal proportion. In a 
static setting, we obtain the traditional median-voter result, where, if the voter 
with the median income is poorer than the mean, her preferred tax rate will be 
the policy outcome of electoral competition between two parties. In this 
context, where taxation has no deadweight loss, the preferred tax “rate” is 
actually complete expropriation. 
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This  result  breaks  down  when  a  temporal  dimension  is  given  to  the  
problem. The simplest way to see the underlying mechanism is to analyze 
what happens when income is deterministic. The transition function yt 1       
f ytspecifies how (pre-tax) income changes from one period to the next. 
Transition functions are assumed to be increasing. 
The first case to be analyzed focuses on a two-period scenario where 
individuals vote at date 0 on a tax scheme to be implemented at date 1. If we 
call   , the cumulative income distribution at date t and    , the average 
income at date t, an individual with time-zero income y will prefer a laissez-
faire approach (a zero tax-rate, r0) to full redistribution (r1) if her date-1 income 
will be higher than the date-1 average. 
 
 ( )  ∫                             (33) 
 
From Jensen´s inequality, if f is strictly concave, the agent with a mean 
income in period 0 will oppose redistribution.  
 
 (  )   (∫     )  ∫                           (34) 
 
At the same time, the individual with the lowest initial income will surely 
favor redistribution. This underlies the result that there is a critical income 
level below the average income such that individuals with higher income 
oppose redistribution and those with lower income favor redistribution. The 
main result, though, is that, for any income distribution F0, a laissez-faire 
policy will be preferred by the median voter under some concave transition 
function   . In fact, this will be the case for all functions that are more 
concave than   . 
A second step, which highlights the role of persistence in government 
policies, assumes that agents choose at time 0 a tax scheme that will be in 
place during periods 0 through T. Agents care about their present discounted 
income stream. Given a transition function f and initial income y, an individual 
will prefer a laissez-faire policy if: 
 
∑ 𝛿   ( )  ∑ 𝛿   
 
   
 
           (35) 
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where    is the result of applying f , t successive times. The results are similar. 
In the first place, there is, as before, an income level y* such that people with 
higher incomes will favor a laissez-faire approach and those with lower 
incomes will want redistribution. This support for a laissez-faire policy 
changes depending on two features of the model: the transition function, and 
the time horizon of the policy change (which includes the number of time 
periods and the discount factor). Indeed, longer temporal horizons and higher 
discount factors promote support for a laissez-faire response. Once again, this 
effect operates through the convexity of transition functions: as the time 
horizon grows, transition functions are composed, generating            and 
these functions are increasingly concave.  
These observations carry over to the case where income is stochastic. In 
this case, the analog of the concavity of the transition function is the existence 
of a stochastic process for individual income which is concave in expectation. 
That is, the expected value of income tomorrow, given today’s income, is a 
concave function of the latter. In this case, again, for every distribution we can 
find a stochastic income process such that the median voter opposes 
redistribution. This case of the POUM hypothesis posits agents with 
completely rational expectations and is consistent with very unequal realized 
income distributions in each period. 
Although there is no model of the underlying income-generating process, 
this result captures one of the essential consequences of social mobility in the 
political arena. Social mobility can be seen as implying concave transition 
functions (this idea is explored in Benabou and Ok, 2001b). It reduces political 
conflict between the pivotal voter and the rich, thereby reducing equilibrium 
redistribution.30 
                                                 
30 In a related result, Harms and Zink (2003) develop a model where this result (the median voter 
preferring no redistribution) follows from an explicit economic choice problem, where 
individuals vote on a tax on their earnings and choose their skill level. If the median voter can 
finance his education and there is a skill premium, he may expect to lose from redistribution 
when he enters the labor market. In that case, the prospect of increasing the distance 
between the median voter and the poor – even if there is no real exchange mobility – 
reduces his support for redistribution. 
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As we have already mentioned, Benabou (1996) summarizes several 
models in which political variables affect mobility. Basically, in the presence 
of imperfect capital markets, redistribution is economically desirable. Whether 
it can be expected to be the outcome of the political process, however, depends 
on what group in society has the most political weight. That is, he allows for a 
departure from the “one person = one vote” paradigm. This departure is 
summarized by the distance, in terms of wealth, between the median agent 
(who we would expect to be pivotal in a traditional setting) and the pivotal 
voter (whose preferences are represented by the political system). 
Benabou finds that if political power is held disproportionately by a 
wealthy minority, then redistribution is inefficiently low (in the sense that 
increasing redistribution unambiguously increases efficiency), as is mobility in 
the asset distribution. Moreover, there are multiple steady states, with 
intertemporal efficiency being lower in less redistributive, more inegalitarian 
steady states with lower mobility. On the other hand, if the political system has 
some degree of pro-poor bias, there will be only one steady state, with high 
redistribution. 
The main idea is, therefore, that the degree of distributional conflict in a 
society affects its equilibrium level of redistribution. Increasing social mobility 
reduces this conflict and thus curbs the demand for redistribution. In contexts 
where redistribution is inefficient, this would be a desirable result. In 
environments where redistribution is efficient, however, it is often the case that 
mobility is not exogenous to the political outcome, but rather is endogenously 
determined within the model. In this case, it is far from obvious that reducing 
redistribution is in any way desirable. 
 
VI.  The perception of mobility  
 
In the models we discuss in this section, individual income depends on 
parental background, effort, and luck. With no market imperfections, 
redistributive schemes based on income taxes are inefficient, as they distort the 
labor/leisure choice. Individuals’ beliefs about the income process affect their 
preferences regarding the amount of redistribution. At the same time, the 
existence of a redistributive scheme changes individual incentives to exert 
effort. Low transfers provide an incentive for work, which in turn lowers the 
impact of luck. High transfers, in contrast, lower the incentive to exert effort, 
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with the consequence that luck plays a more important role in individual 
outcomes. As a consequence, individual beliefs are self-fulfilling. 
We first draw attention to the model developed by Piketty (1995). His 
intention is to understand why it is that, although by and large poor people 
support redistribution more than the rich do, family background affects these 
preferences. Indeed, most of the available data indicate that poor people who 
have experienced downward mobility (that is, their parents were relatively 
rich) oppose redistribution more than the average poor individual does, 
whereas high-income people from a poor background tend to support 
redistribution more than the average rich person does. The point of the paper is 
to show how this can be brought about, not by a difference in redistributive 
aims (all agents will have the same goals), but rather by differences in income 
trajectories which inform agents’ beliefs about the world. 
There is a continuum of dynasties. At each point in time there is one 
generation that votes on taxes for the following period, works, and pays the 
taxes specified by the preceding generation. There are two possible pre-tax 
income levels: y1, y0 (with y1 > y0), which are randomly assigned in the 
population, with a probability distribution that depends on two factors: family 
background (children of parents who obtained a high income in the previous 
period have a higher probability of having a high income than do children of 
poor parents), and effort, where all individuals share the same cost of effort, C. 
 
  (      |               )        
  (      |               )              
                    (36) 
       −  (   ) 
 ( )  
  
  
      
 
There are two relevant parameters in this model: the advantage derived 
from being born in a rich family, 1   0, and the degree to which effort affects 
the probability distribution over outcomes, . These are unknown to the agents 
in the model. 
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Agents vote for their preferred tax rate after they choose their effort level 
and after their income is realized. Voters can be divided into four groups based 
on their background and current situation: 
 
Table 13. 
Voting Groups 
 
 
The  tax  redistribution  scheme  operates  by  taking  income  from  those  
with  high realizations and making transfers to those with low realizations. All 
agents share the same objective function: they would like to minimize the 
effective disadvantage suffered by children from poor families – that is, they 
want to maximize their expected welfare. 
Agents choose their effort levels, and this choice is distorted by setting a 
high tax rate. In fact: 
 
e  t 1 ,   a  1 t 1  y1  y0            (37) 
 
Taking this into account, the optimal tax rate for an individual is: 
 
    (  −     )      (  −   )  (  −   ) 
      (38) 
 
where H is the proportion of individuals who receive   . The tradeoff which 
agents face when choosing their preferred tax rate is that high taxes discourage 
effort and lower total output. If all agents shared the same beliefs, however, all 
would choose the same rate: if they believe income differences are mainly 
driven by background, they will favor high redistribution; if, on the other hand, 
they believe effort is the main driving force, they will oppose redistribution 
due to its incentive costs, since it will affect equilibrium effort and thus the 
 Parents’ Income 
y
0
 y
1
 
 
Agent’s Income 
 y
0
 Stable Low Income      Downward Mobile 
y
1
    Upward Mobile     Stable High Income 
 1 
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long-term equilibrium income distribution for children from poor families. 
This is what is spelled out in equation (38). 
Note that the only source of disagreement in this economy is about the 
fundamentals of the model: there is no conflict of interest in the strict sense of 
the word. How, then, are beliefs about the true state of the world formed? 
Piketty explores the implications of purely individual rational learning – that 
is, starting from a given prior and observing the experience of their parents, 
agents update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. In turn, these posterior beliefs 
guide their choice of action.31 
The crux of the argument has to do with the fact that the restrictions placed 
by Bayes’ rule on individual learning are very lax. Starting from a prior, 
Bayesian updating will put more weight on posterior beliefs which are 
consistent with actual experience.  In other words, if an individual experiences 
high mobility, posterior beliefs will be such that upward mobility, given the 
agents’ choices and priors, is most likely. However, there is no necessary link 
between this and the actual parameters of the model; interpretations will vary 
depending on beliefs, as we show in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. 
Interpretation of upwardly mobile trajectory 
 
 
Piketty shows that there is a continuum of possible dynastic types in a 
steady state.  The two ends of this spectrum correspond, on the one hand, to 
those who believe effort is more important and who therefore oppose 
redistribution, exert a high level of effort and have high average incomes (the 
                                                 
31 The optimal actions depend both on individual beliefs about the true model and on beliefs 
about what other people believe, since this will inform each individual’s response to tax rates. 
Piketty shows that, at the extremes, where people assume that everybody else shares their 
beliefs, or where they know the exact distribution of beliefs, the preferred tax rate still 
increases as an individual’s belief in the importance of luck rises, and decreases as 
individual’s belief in the significance of effort increases, which is what Piketty needs to arrive 
at the main result. 
Prior Beliefs Action Bayesian 
High  1 −  0, Low   Low Effort Large role of chance 
Low  1 −  0, High   High Effort Large role of effort 
 1 
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“right-wing” dynasties) and, on the other, those who believe luck plays a more 
central role and who therefore support redistribution, exert a low level of effort 
and have low average incomes (the “left-wing” dynasties). A one-time 
experience of downward mobility despite a high level of effort, or of upward 
mobility despite a low level of effort, will not fully counterbalance these long-
run dynastic beliefs, since every agent is aware of the “sampling effects” (i.e., 
of the fact that there is, after all, some degree of random luck). 
In this model, therefore, conflicting views about social mobility and the 
incentive effects of redistribution are perfectly compatible with the absence of 
any deep conflict in terms of beliefs about what a fair social outcome is. It 
shows how history and personal mobility experience can lead to divergent 
views about the world and, in particular, how all the views can be consistent 
with one “true” state of the world.32 When agents do not have an incentive to 
engage in widespread experimentation, this outcome is indeed likely. A second  
result  is  that  there  is  no  necessary  relation  between  the  optimal  level  of 
redistribution for the true parameter and the level which obtains in the long-
run equilibrium. This model therefore underscores how fragile normative 
recommendations are and thus, how sensitive they are to the introduction of 
reasonable forms of uncertainty about the true model. 
A related sort of connection between beliefs and mobility is introduced in 
the work of Benabou and Tirole (2006). They start from the fact that, as 
mentioned earlier, the extent to which people believe luck is an important 
determinant of individual outcomes is highly correlated with their preferred 
redistribution levels. These authors subsequently present a model with two 
equilibria: one in which people believe the world is fair and that effort is 
consequently an important determinant of success in life, and they therefore 
oppose high levels of redistribution; and one in which people believe the world 
is mostly unfair and hence support redistribution and exert low levels of effort. 
This is compatible with the actual world being either “fair” or “unfair”; thus, 
in one of the equilibria, people are consistently wrong. 
This model starts from a setup that is very similar to the one found in 
Piketty (1995). The main difference lies in the condition that the first 
                                                 
32 These are empirically important, as is demonstrated by the evidence presented in Graham 
and Pettinato (2002) and in Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and by the references in Piketty 
(1995). 
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generation – in a two-period game – chooses an optimal belief, given the 
beliefs of others and the redistribution level that will follow in equilibrium. A 
second departure is that tax rates are voted upon selfishly. 
The setup is the following. There is a continuum of agents, indexed by i. As 
in Piketty (1995), income is the result of an interaction among innate 
advantages, effort, and luck. 
 
  (    )   
     
             (    )   − ( 
     )
        (39) 
 
As before, e is effort and    reflects parental background:    takes on a 
high value for a fraction    1/ 2 , and a low value for the rest. 
At date zero, parents receive a signal which noisily informs them about the 
true value of  . They subsequently choose what to tell their children (or 
themselves, in a different interpretation). Once they or their children have the 
revised signal (which they know to be potentially distorted), at time 1, they 
vote on the tax rate that would maximize their own welfare and choose their 
optimal effort level (in the intergenerational interpretation, this is done by their 
descendents). Lastly, their income is realized in the following period, and 
redistribution and consumption take place.  
An individual’s preferred tax rate has three components: the larger the 
innate differences in income prospects are ( i  , the difference with respect 
to the average), the higher the rate is, there is a POUM effect: optimistic 
individuals who expect a higher return to effort also expect to move up the  
income distribution, and this lowers their preferred tax rate, and finally, if 
individual effort is distorted downward because of the lag between effort and 
consumption, the optimal tax will be lower for individuals who see this policy 
channel as a way of correcting that distortion.  
The authors show that two distinct equilibria arise. In one, a large 
proportion of the population chooses to believe that the world is fair. 
Therefore, these people vote for a low tax rate. This justifies their belief that 
effort pays, since, in equilibrium, low-income individuals are more than 
proportionately likely to have exerted a low level of effort. In the other, a 
majority chooses to believe that the world is intrinsically unfair and votes for a 
high degree of redistribution. This reduces individual incentives to exert effort, 
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with the result that, in equilibrium, people with high pre-tax incomes are 
disproportionately from high-income backgrounds. Note that both equilibria 
are possible regardless of the true state of the world. The story told in the 
paper is that of a true world in which effort does not pay, but in which people 
may choose to believe it does because they need to “believe in a just world”. 
A similar multiple-equilibria model with differences in beliefs that lead to 
differences in preferences over redistribution is that of Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005). In their case, however, these are truly rational expectation equilibria, 
with self-fulfilling beliefs. 
Agents live for two periods and engage in a productive activity in each of 
them. Taxes are set at some point in the middle of an agent’s life, which is 
parameterized in the model. Pre-tax income is determined by individual ability 
(A), investment during the first period of life (k), and effort in the second 
period (e), as well as by a certain amount of “noise” ( ). Both ability and noise 
are random and i.i.d. across agents.   reflects the point in life when taxes are 
set (it reflects what investments are sunk when the tax rate is decided). 
 
yi   Ai   ki   1   ei  I                                 (40) 
 
The government imposes a flat tax rate on income and shares the proceeds 
equally among all agents. 
People have an intrinsic demand for social justice and fairness (they would 
like to reduce the impact of sheer luck in individual income) but at the same 
time would like to reward individual effort and talent.33 Accordingly, they 
consider a fair income to be: 
 
yˆi   Ai  ki   1   ei                                                                                                                                                              (41) 
 
Thus, there is a level of “socially fair” income for given characteristics of 
individuals, namely, that which an individual would obtain with no taxes and 
no noise. Overall social fairness is given by the extent to which after-tax 
                                                 
33 Note the relation with the concepts of meritocracy and of equalization of opportunities 
by reducing variability in outcomes as outlined by Conlisk (1974). 
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incomes differ from this ideal. Social injustice is a weighted average of the 
“variance decomposition” of income inequality. 
 
       ( ̂ )  ( −  
 )   (  −  ̂ )      (42) 
  
If incomes were exogenous, and minimizing   was the only goal, then the 
referred level of redistribution would be: 
 
   
 
 
   ( ̂ )
   (    ̂ )
         (43) 
 
which is decreasing in the “signal-to-noise” ratio: the higher the variability in 
the noise component, the more desirable redistribution would be. 
However, this ratio is endogenous in equilibrium, since equilibrium effort 
depends on the expected tax rate. A high expected tax rate reduces the 
incentive to engage in productive effort, thereby increasing the importance of 
noise in realized income and thus providing a rationale for voting for high 
levels of redistribution. The opposite holds true for a low expected tax rate. 
The consequence is that both kinds of equilibrium are possible and compatible 
with rational expectations. Thus, concerns for fairness are compatible with 
both high and low levels of redistribution in equilibrium. 
In all three papers, we see that beliefs about the true nature of the income 
process may drive economically powerful forces regardless of whether they 
are correct (and, in a sense, with multiple rational-expectations equilibria, 
there is no “outside world” that is independent from beliefs). This relates to the 
POUM hypothesis, in that it may well be that beliefs about the existence of 
social mobility – or equality of opportunity, as in the papers that we have 
mentioned – drive demands for redistribution. As we will discuss in the 
following section on the empirical evidence, the studies conducted thus far 
indicate that this is indeed the case. 
 
VII.  Conclusions: a roundup of policy implications 
 
In this discussion we explored a series of definitions of social mobility and 
settled on one according to which situations with high mobility are considered 
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to be those where the relative economic status of an agent is not dependent on 
starting conditions such as family background or connections. 
As is detailed in Table 15, most of the models we have studied suggest 
there is room for addressing social immobility through some sort of education 
policy. A question remains, though: what are the limits on education’s impact? 
In other words: how far can we possibly go in the direction of social mobility? 
Table 15 adds a policy intervention that, while related to education, is not 
explicitly addressed by the models we have surveyed but that is implied by 
their treatment of “ability” and its intergenerational transmission: early 
childhood interventions. This is motivated by a strand of research that departs 
from the unidimensional conception of “ability” embraced by most economists 
and scrutinizes the process of skill formation. We provide an overview, based 
on the survey by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (CHLM) (2005). 
This section suggests that a combination of different policies has the 
potential to improve social mobility in the short and long terms. 
In the short run, policy should deal with the fact that some degree of 
immobility is unavoidable, given the long-lasting consequences of poor 
parental environments. However, efforts should be made to ensure that 
individuals from poor households who have managed to acquire skills have the 
opportunity to develop them further. The steps to be taken in this direction 
should include the creation of mechanisms for financing higher education and 
discouraging discrimination and nepotism in labor markets, possibly by 
increasing market competition and transparency in State hiring. 
For long-run results, however, the most promising policies appear to be 
early intervention programs, which can break down the dependence between 
the development of socially productive skills and parental background. These 
initiatives hold out the promise of greatly improving both social mobility and 
economic efficiency at one and the same time. Efforts should be made to 
design interventions which take into account local conditions, along with 
carefully designed evaluations, so that lessons can be learned in terms of how 
such initiatives are operated, how they can be improved, and how they can be 
extended into large-scale programs. 
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Table 15. 
Policy 
 
B00: Benabou, 2000  
BT79: Becker and Tomes, 
1979  
C74: Conlisk, 1974  
CHLM05: Cunha, Heckman, 
Lochner and Masterov, 2005  
HM00: Hassler and Mora, 2000  
HMZ03: Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and 
Zeira, 2003  
OW98: Owen and Weil, 1998  
P95: Piketty, 1995  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Effect Model Possible Limitations 
 
Public School 
System 
 
Reduces the need for 
educational finance. 
Makes education more 
uniform. 
 
C74 
HMZ03 
OW98 
 
 
Takes ability (and 
its transmission) as 
given 
 
Early Childhood 
Intervention 
Reduces intergenerational 
transmission of skills, or parental 
advantage in education, by directly  
aaddressing the mechanisms of 
ability information. 
B00 
BT79 
C74 
CHLM05 
HMZ03 
 
 
 
Political Feasibility 
 
 
Education Loans 
Provides financing to those who 
would profit from education but 
face liquidity constraints. 
 
B00 
HMZ03 
OW98 
 
Takes ability (and 
its transmission) as 
given 
 
Inheritance Tax 
 
Reduces income inequality and 
immobility that stems from 
financing bequests. 
 
 
BT79 
P95 
Endogeneity of 
bequests and other 
investments in 
children limits the 
feasibility of full 
equalization 
 
Promotion of 
Competitive Markets 
Reduces the impact of 
noncognitive parental 
advantages (race, connections) 
by making actual productivity 
matter in hiring decisions. 
Makes entrepreneurial activities 
more complex and dynamic 
 
 
BT79 
C74 
HM00 
 
 
 
Political feasibility 
Transition 
 
 1 
ECONÓMICA 
 
226 
References 
 
Alesina, Alberto, and George-Marios Angeletos (2005). “Fairness and 
Redistribution.” American Economic Review, Vol. 95(4): 960-960. 
Arrow, Kenneth, Bowles, Samuel, and Steven, eds. Durlauf (2000). 
Meritocracy and economic inequality. Princeton, N.J. 
Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes (1979). “An Equilibrium Theory of the 
Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility.” Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol. 87(6): 1153- 1189. 
Behrman, Jere R. (2000). “Social Mobility: Concepts and Measurement.” In 
New markets, new opportunities? Economic and social mobility in a changing 
world, 69-100. Washington, D.C. 
Benabou, Roland, and Efe A. Ok. (2001a). “Social Mobility and the Demand 
for Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Vol. 116(2): 447- 487. 
Benabou, Roland, and Efe A. Ok. (2001b). “Mobility as Progressivity: 
Ranking Income Processes According to Equality of Opportunity.” NBER 
Working Paper No. 8431. 
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. (2006). “Belief in a Just World and 
Redistributive Politics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 121(2): 699-
746. 
Benabou, Roland. (1996). “Inequality and Growth.” In NBER macroeconomics 
annual 1996, 11-74. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 
Benabou, Roland (2000). “Meritocracy, Redistribution, and the Size of the 
Pie.” In Meritocracy and economic inequality, 317-339. Princeton University 
Press. 
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis (2002). “The Inheritance of Inequality.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 16(3): 3-30. 
Conlisk, John. (1974). “Can Equalization of Opportunity Reduce Social 
Mobility?.” American Economic Review. Vol. 64(1): 80-90 . 
SOCIAL MOBILITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
 
 
227 
Cunha, Flavio, Heckman, James J., Lochner, Lance, and Dimitriy V. Masterov 
(2005). “Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation.” NBER 
Working Paper No. 11331. 
Dworkin, Ronald (1981). “What is Equality?”. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
Vol. 10(3), 185- 246, 283-345. 
Feldman, Marcus W., Otto, Sarah P., and Freddy B. Christiansen (2000). 
“Genes, Culture, and Inequality.” In Meritocracy and economic inequality, 61-
85. Princeton University Press. 
Fields, Gary S. (2000). “Income Mobility: Concepts and Measures.” In New 
markets, new opportunities? Economic and social mobility in a changing 
world, 101-132. Washington, D.C. 
Flynn, James (2000). “IQ trends over time: intelligence, race, and 
meritocracy.”  In Meritocracy and economic inequality, 35-60. Princeton 
University Press. 
Graham, Carol, and Stefano Pettinato (2002). “Frustrated Achievers: Winners, 
Losers and Subjective Well-Being in New Market Economies.” Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol. 38(4): 100-140. 
Hansson, Sven Ove (2004). “What Are Opportunities and Why Should They 
Be Equal?.” Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 22(2): 305-316. 
Harms, Philipp, and Stefan Zink (2003). “Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the 
Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute.” Public 
Choice. Vol. 116(3-4): 351-366. 
Hassler, John, and Jose V. Rodriguez Mora. (2000). “Intelligence, Social 
Mobility, and Growth.” American Economic Review. Vol. 90(4): 888-908. 
Hassler, John, Rodriguez Mora, Jose Vicente, and Joseph Zeira (2003). 
“Inequality and Mobility.” C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers No. 2497. 
Herrnstein  Richard  and  Murray  Charles (1994).  “Bell  Curve:  Intelligence  
and  Class Structure in American Life”. New York: The Free Press. 
Hild, Matthias, and Alex Voorhoeve (2004). “Equality of Opportunity and 
Opportunity Dominance.” Economics and Philosophy. Vol. 20(1): 117-145. 
ECONÓMICA 
 
228 
Jencks, Christopher and Laura Tach (2005). “Would Equal Opportunity Mean 
More Mobility?” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Faculty Research 
Working Paper Series RWP05-037. 
Korenman, Sanders, and Christopher Winship (2000). “A Reanalysis of The 
Bell Curve: Intelligence, Family Background, and Schooling.” In Meritocracy 
and economic inequality, 137-178. Princeton University Press. 
Owen, Ann L., and David N. Weil (1998). “Intergenerational Earnings 
Mobility, Inequality and Growth.” Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 
41(1): 71-104. 
Phelan, Christopher (2006). “Opportunity and Social Mobility.” Review of 
Economic Studies. Vol. 73(2): 487-504. 
Piketty, Thomas (1995). “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 110(3): 551-584. 
Piketty, Thomas (2000). “Theories of Persistent Inequality and 
Intergenerational Mobility.” In Handbook of income distribution. Vol. 1: 429-
476. Handbooks in Economics. Vol. 16. 
Raut, Lakshmi K (1996). “Signalling Equilibrium, Intergenerational Mobility 
and Long- Run Growth.” University of Hawaii-Manoa. Draft.  
Ravallion, Martin, and Michael Lokshin (2000). “Who Wants to Redistribute? 
The Tunnel Effect in 1990s Russia.” Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 76(1): 
87-104. 
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Roemer, John E. (1996). Theories of distributive justice. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Roemer, John E. (1998). Equality of Opportunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Roemer, John E. (2000). "Equality of Opportunity." In Meritocracy and 
economic inequality, 17-32. Princeton University Press. 
Roemer, John E. (2004). “Equal Opportunity and Intergenerational Mobility: 
Going beyond Intergenerational Income Transition Matrices.” In Generational 
SOCIAL MOBILITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
 
 
229 
income mobility in North America and Europe, 48-57. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Sen, Amartya (2000”. “Merit and Justice.” In Meritocracy and economic 
inequality, 5-16. Princeton University Press. 
Sugden, Robert (2004). “Living with Unfairness: The Limits of Equal 
Opportunity in a Market Economy.” Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 22(1): 
211-236. 
Swift, Adam (2005). "Justice, Luck, and the Family: The Intergenerational 
Transmission of Economic Advantage from a Normative Perspective." In 
Unequal chances: Family background and economic success, 256-276. New 
York. 
Young, Michael (1958). The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033: An Essay on 
Education and Equality. Penguin Books. 
